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The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance
Abstract
Most of the corporate governance literature rests on a premise that the interests of various stakeholder
groups conflict and that managerial loyalty is more likely to be captured by shareholders than any other
constituency. Yet, stakeholder interests do converge in the objective of controlling managerial slack and
non-equity constituents have substantial influence over firm decisions. Although the study of governance
has taken early steps to abandon its preoccupation with equity-centered solutions and identify
interdependencies existing among a broader range of stakeholders, governance scholars have missed an
important element of interactivity. A stakeholder reacts to the actions of others and thereby contributes to
the collective interest in controlling slack. Each stakeholder has a window on the firm through which it
can acquire some type of information at lower cost than other stakeholders. When a stakeholder detects
an unsatisfactory state of affairs, it reacts by choosing to exit or exercise voice. The exercise of either the
voice or exit option may pressure management to correct the unsatisfactory state of slack. More to the
point, however, a stakeholder's exit bears important information for other stakeholders, at least some of
whom may be better placed to take action that corrects the slack.
This Article describes an interactive system of corporate governance and provides a stylized theory of the
role of lenders within this system. The divergence in the interests of these lenders and other stakeholders
does not preclude interactive governance, but it does threaten to reduce the net benefits from the
process. Therefore, the authors identify a number of legal and institutional mechanisms that help to
channel the efforts of the lender toward the common goal of containing and correcting managerial slack.
The interactive perspective thus permits new explanations for phenomena such as debt covenants,
bankruptcy preference rules and lender liability laws. For example, the definition of debt covenants and
events of default in lending agreements raise the likelihood that the lender exit is prompted by slack
rather than lender opportunism and thereby enhances the informational value of the exit. Bankruptcy
preference rules encourage early exit before the firm becomes insolvent, thereby enabling remaining
stakeholders to take action before the firm's condition becomes irreparable. Thus, debt covenants and
preference rules provide a window that increases the value of lender exit in prompting the correction of
managerial slack.

Disciplines
Law

Comments
Reprinted from University of California Law Review, Volume 83, 1995, pages 1073-1113.

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/law_series/12

The Role of Debt in Interactive
Corporate Governance
George G. Triantist
Ronald J. Daniels~
Most ofthe corporate governance literature rests on a premise that the
interests ofvarious stakeholder groups conflict and that managerial loyalty
is more likely to be captured by shareholders than any other constituency.
Yet, stakeholder interests do converge in the objective ofcontrolling managerial slack and nonequity constituents have substantial influence overfirm
decisions. Although the study ofgovernance has taken early steps to abandon its preoccupation with equity-centered solutions and identify interdependencies existing among a broader range of stakeholders, governance
scholars have missed an important element of interactivity. A stakeholder
reacts to the actions of others and thereby contributes to the collective
interest in controlling slack. Each stakeholder has a window on the firm
through which it can acquire some type of information at lower cost than
other stakeholders. When a stakeholder detects an unsatisfactory state of
affairs, it reacts by choosing to exit or exercise voice. The exercise of
either the voice or exit option may pressure management to correct the
unsatisfactory state ofslack. More to the point, however, a stakeholder's
exit bears important information for other stakeholders, at least some of
whom may be better placed to take action that corrects the slack.
This Article describes an interactive system of corporate governance
andprOVides a stylized theory ofthe role oflenders within this system. The
divergence in the interests ofthese lenders and other stakeholders does not
preclude interactive governance, but it does threaten to reduce the net benefits from the process. Therefore, the authors identify a number of legal
and institutional mechanisms that help to channel the efforts of the lender
toward the common goal of containing and correcting managerial slack.
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The interactive perspective thus permits new explanations for phenomena
such as debt covenants, bankruptcy preference rules and lender liability
laws. For example, the definition ofdebt covenants and events ofdefault in
lending agreements raise the likelihood that the lender exit is prompted by
slack rather than lender opportunism and thereby enhances the informational value of the exit. Bankruptcy preference rules encourage early exit
before the firm becomes insolvent, thereby enabling remaining stakeholders
to take action before the firm's condition becomes irreparable. Thus, debt
covenants and preference rules provide a window that increases the value
of lender exit in prompting the correction of managerial slack
INTRODUCTION

Berle and Means set the terms of the modern corporate governance
debate by observing the separation of ownership and control in the modern
American corporation. 1 The divergence in interest between owners (the
shareholders) and those who control the decisions of the firm (the managers) is now well understood through managerial agency theory. In this
light, shareholders are justifiably concerned about managerial behavior that
impedes the maximization of firm value: notably, lapses in managerial
competence or effort, managerial entrenchment or empire building, and
excessive managerial compensation or perquisite consumption. We refer to
these problems collectively as managerial slack.2 We use the term "slack"
to indicate that these problems can be remedied, particularly if they are
detected early. One example of managerial slack is the failure of management to react effectively to changes in a firm's environment. The demise of
a corporation is often attributed to such exogenous changes as, for example,
decreases in demand for the firm's products or increases in its costs. Yet,
managerial slack in the form of failure to react effectively to the changes,
and the corresponding delay in detecting and correcting such slack, are ultimately more interesting causes of business failure than the shocks
themselves.
In his Presidential Address to the American Finance Association in
1993, Michael Jensen observed that a modern industrial revolution has
taken place since the early 1970s, in which technological advances, organizational innovation, deregulation, and the expansion of global trade have
created excess capacity in many industries. 3 Firms in those industries (particularly the relatively high-cost businesses) should respond by downsizing
1. ADoLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
2. The tenn "slack" comes from Albert O. Hirschman. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE,
AND LoYALTY: REsPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 10-15 (1970).
Hirschman attributes the concept to RiCHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY
OF THE FIRM (1963). HIRSCHMAN, supra, at 11 n.?
3. Michael C. Jensen, The Modem Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal
Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 835-47 (1993).
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or shutting down production. Ultimately, the unavoidable discipline of
product markets forces such firms to reach this result. Yet, exit driven by
product-market discipline comes later and at a significantly higher cost than
if it were effected by a firm adjusting promptly and continuously to exogenous changes. Such timely action, however, is impeded by managerial
slack and employee resistance.
The study of corporate governance is the examination of mechanisms
that deter and correct managerial slack. Scholars divide these mechanisms
into internal and external disciplinary forces. A firm's internal control system includes its board of directors4 (particularly outside directors),5 the
proxy voting process,6 shareholder proposals,? and fiduciary duties owed by
directors to the firm. 8 The external discipline comes from the markets in
which the managers and their firms compete: the managerial labor mar-

4. At one time, the board of directors was viewed as an institutional panacea for accountability
problems. See. e.g.• Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?
95 HARv. L. REv. 597, 597-600 (1982) (discussing idea of independent director as "Iegitimator of
corporate power"); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the
Modem Corporation: Officers. Directors. and Accountants. 63 CALIF. L. REv. 375, 375-76 (1975)
(chal1enging the "received legal model of corporate decisionmaking," in which the board manages the
corporation). Nevertheless, subsequent scholarship observed that the prospect of effective vigilance by
the board is often undermined by the ability of managers to influence the makeup and performance of
the board. For discussions of the relationship between the board of directors and the managers, see
general1y, Brudney, supra; Eisenberg, supra; Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American
Law Institute Corporate Governance Project. 35 STAN. L. REv. 927 (1983). At least prior to the rise of
large institutional equity investors, the shareholders of large corporations were too dispersed to impose
any effective counterweight against the influence of managerial insiders. See Jayne W. Barnard,
Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance. 69 N.C. L. REv. 1135, 1149-50 (1991);
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control. 26 J.L. & BeON. 301,
313-15 (1983). See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:
An Agendafor Institutional Investors 43 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1991); Steven N. Kaplan & David Reishus,
Outside Directorships and Corporate Peifonnance. 27 J. FIN. ECON. 389 (1990).
5. Outside directors often playa significant role in firm decisions. In many corporations, they
are active members of board subcommittees that oversee audits, executive compensation, and
nominations. They are assigned increasingly important roles in reviewing transactions that raise
conflicts of interest within the board. See generally AMEuCAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, vol. I, pts. III, V, VI (1994).
6. See generally Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of
Publicly Held Corporations. 23 J. FIN. BeON. 29 (1989).
7. Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1994). See
generally Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, Infonnation. Ownership Structure. and Shareholder Voting:
Evidencefrom Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals. 48 J. FIN. 697 (1993).
8. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36
J.L. & BeON. 425 (1993).
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kets,9 capital markets (notably the market for corporate control),IO and
product markets. II
During the 1980s, leveraged buyouts and takeovers acted as the predominant method of correcting managerial slack by removing managers
who failed, for instance, to downsize operations in the face of excess capacity. By the end of the decade, managers and employees combined to implement takeover defenses, to challenge hostile takeover attempts in court and
to lobby for antitakeover laws in state legislatures. 12 These responses, coupled with the growing public apprehension over the leveraging of American
corporations, brought about the demise of the takeover as a disciplinary
device, leaving internal mechanisms to correct slack before product markets
forced downsizing or liquidation. To many observers, including Michael
Jensen, these internal forces are too weak to force timely and efficient
responses to excess capacity.13 The current hope lies in the emergence of
sophisticated investors who hold large equity stakes in corporations and
consequently both the ability and the incentives to pressure boards of directors to discipline their managers. 14
The typical model of corporate governance generally views managerial
agency problems through the lens of equity interests. IS Shareholders play
9. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory ofthe Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 293
(1980); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics
in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 838-40 (1981).
10. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the MarketjOr Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965). During the 1980s, takeovers were facilitated by the availability of high-yield (junk) bond
financing, and the resulting market for corporate control was heralded by some as the most potent
constraint on managerial conduct. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role
ofa Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1168-73 (1981)
(describing tender offers as one method ofmonitoring managerial behavior); Roberta Romano, A Guide
to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation. 9 YALE J. ON REo. 119, 129-31 (1992) (discussing
how takeovers discipline managerial misbehavior). The intensity of the takeover threat drove
management (allied with other stakeholder groups) to prevail directly on the political process and
indirectly on the judiciary to constrain its force. For an account of the demise of the takeover
instrument, see Jeffel}' N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1931 (1991)
(chronicling the events surrounding Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1989».
1I. See RALPH K. WINTER, GOVERNMENr AND THE CORPORATION 20-21 (1978); Fama, supra note
9, at 289; Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory ofthe Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 327-30 (1976).
12. See generally Gordon, supra note 10.
13. Jensen, supra note 3, at 852-62 (providing anecdotal and quantitative evidence of failure of
internal control systems).
14. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 4; Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89
MICH. L. REv. 520, 567-75 (1990); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. LJ. 445, 447-53 (1991); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 465-71 (1986).
15. While corporate governance scholarship has responded to the Berle and Means concern over
diffuse shareholder voting rights, it remains focused to a large degree on mechanisms that rely on the
initiative of equity investors: for example, the election of outside directors, derivative suits, and
takeover bids. For instance, Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman comment on the marginal role of
banks in American corporate governance:
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the central role in the internal disciplinary mechanisms identified above.
They vote for directors, engage in proxy contests, present shareholder proposals, and sue to enforce fiduciary duties owed to the firm. In addition, the
market for corporate control is a market for equity interests. There is, however, a distinct body of literature that examines the screening and monitoring activities of debtholders. It has evolved separately because it is largely
unconcerned with the self-interested behavior of managers. Instead, it
assumes that managers are perfect agents of their shareholders and focuses
on the conflict between debtholders and equityholders. This literature, for
example, explains lending through financial intermediaries as delegated
monitoring: the intermediary pools money from investors, lends it, and
monitors on their behalf. I6 Intermediation resolves the problems of freeriding and duplicative monitoring efforts. Moreover, the intermediary itself
typically enjoys information-producing economies that make it a superior
screening and monitoring agentP The role of the bank in particular as a
delegated monitor for its depositors is well established in the literature. I8
Beyond the delegation of monitoring responsibility by investors to
intermediaries, there is a growing awareness of the interdependencies
among various debtholders of a given firm. A creditor's monitoring activities produce positive and negative externalities for other creditors. I9 If a
creditor's monitoring deters borrower mishandling, it reduces the risk on all
By restricting the size of banks and the scope and geographical range of their activities, the
regulatory web enveloping the American financial services industry has tightly restricted bank
influence. Neither their credit provision function nor their limited equity ownership provide
banks with sufficient power and incentive to monitor.
As a result, the monitoring role in the American corporate governance system is relegated
to those who provide only equity capital to the corporation-the shareholders.
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of
MSIC in the Corporate Governance"Debate, 45 STAN L. REv. 985, 989-90 (1993) (footnote omitted).
16. See. e.g.• Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. 51 REv.
ECON. STUD. 393 (1984); Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries. Financial
Structure. and Financial Intermediation. 32 J. FIN. 371, 382-84 (1977) (identifying the signaling
advantages of a lending intermediary).
17. See, e.g.• Leland & Pyle, supra note 16, at 371-72. Leland and Pyle suggest that financial
intermediation solves the public good problem of information and, because the intermediary invests
some of its own capital, establishes the credibility of its information. Id. at 372; see also Eugene F.
Fama, What's Different About Banks? IS J. MONETARY ECON. 29, 36 (1985).
18. See. e.g.• George J. Benston & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., A Transactions Cost Approach to the
Theory ofFinancial Intermediation. 31 J. FIN. 215, 219, 223 (1976) (noting that banks are efficient in
obtaining confidential information because they can easily acquire reputation for discretion); Fischer
Black, Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market. 2 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 326 (1975) (explaining
that bank's record of borrower as depositor provides low-cost credit information); Tim S. Campbell,
Optimal Investment Financing Decisions and the Value of Confidentiality. 14 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 913, 921 (1979) (describing duty of confidentiality imposed on banks); Tim S. Campbell &
William A. Kracaw, Information Production, Market Signalling. and the Theory of Financial
Intermediation. 35 J. FIN. 863, 880 (1980) (arguing that banks enjoy economies when they can jointly
produce information, liquidity, or transactions services).
19. See Randal C. Picker, Security Interests. Misbehavior, and Common Pools. 59 U. Cm. L. REv.
645, 657-60 (1992); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions ofImperfect Information. 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 225, 241-45 (1992).
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the firm's debt. However, if a creditor monitors simply to detect misbehavior before any other creditor with competing claims, the other creditors are
less likely to be paid after the monitoring creditor.20 Moreover, since the
concerns about managerial slack are shared to some degree by all parties
who contribute to the enterprise, interdependencies exist even across classes
of stakeholders.21 The screening and monitoring activities of a lender produce externalities that benefit other creditors and other stakeholders.
These benefits are produced at several periods throughout the relationship between the lender and its borrower. First, the decision to lend signals
to other stakeholders and potential stakeholders the quality of the borrower. 22 Second, other stakeholders know that the imposition offixed obligations under the loan agreement forces managers to disgorge free cash
rather than use it to bankroll forms of managerial slack (for example, managerial perks or empire building).23 These obligations will also force management to raise funds for future projects in vigilant capital markets, rather
than by drawing from a pool of available internal funds,24 Third, when the
lender is given either a security interest in assets of the borrower or some
other form ofpriority rights, these features constrain the ability of managers
to liquidate non-cash assets or to raise new funds by selling debt in the
future. The presence of free cash facilitates managerial slack. Therefore,
by reducing the ability of management to liquidate assets, security interests
and priority rights thereby reduce the risk of slack in a way that benefits
other constituencies as welPs Fourth, many loan covenants, and the
lender's monitoring of the borrower's compliance with such covenants, forbid specific types of behavior by management, thus further constraining
managerial slack.
Based on this understanding, a theory of interdependent screening and
monitoring is evolving to describe externalities that flow not only among
Triantis, supra note 19, at 242-43 (comparing cooperative and competitive monitoring).
21. See generally Saul Levrnore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings.
92 YALE LJ. 49 (1982). See also Bany E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority
Puzzle. 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 89-95 (1993); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Credit Markets and the Control of
Capital. 17 J. MoNEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 133, 140-45 (1985).
22. Fama, supra note 17, at 36-37 (identifYing information and signals picked up by other
stakeholders); Eugene F. Fama, Contract Costs and Financing Decisions, 63 J. Bus. S71, S84-86
(1990). Fama argues that the value of the bank's signal is greater if the bank holds unsecured debt. Id.
20.

at S86.
23. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs ofFree Cash Flow. Corporate Finance. and Takeovers. 76
AM. ECON. REv. 323, 324 (1986). If the firm fails to meet these obligations, the lenders can take steps
to terminate the employment of the managers. See generally F.H. Buckley, The Termination Decision.
61 UMKC L. REv. 243 (1992).
24. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations ofDividends, 74 AM. ECON. REv.
650, 654 (1984) (noting that frequent trips to capital markets for funding results in close, effective
monitoring of management); Jensen, supra note 23, at 323 (noting that internal financing avoids
monitoring associated with debt sold in capital markets).
25. This argument is presented in George G. Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory ofSecured Debt
and Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REv. 2155, 2158-65 (1994).
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creditors, but also from lenders to other stakeholders, particularly shareholders. Our objective in this paper is to take the analysis to its next stage:
a theory of interactive governance. We adopt a broad definition of "governance" that embraces the collective objective of fum value maximization
and includes the activities of non-equity stakeholders. The governance
activity of any individual stakeholder may be disaggregated into two constituent parts: monitoring and reaction. Monitoring involves the ongoing
acquisition, processing, interpretation, and verification of information about
the fum,26 Reaction is the action taken when information culled from the
monitoring process reveals an undesirable state of affairs. In his classic
treatise, Albert Hirschman divided reaction into two types of action: exit
and voice. 27 Exit is the termination of one's relationship with the corporation following the detection of slack. Hence, a lender calls its loan, a shareholder sells her interest, a supplier ceases delivery, a customer switches to a
competitor, or an employee quits. In contrast, voice is a deliberate attempt
to correct, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs,28
Our theory of interactive corporate governance is based on two premises. First, all stakeholders share a common goal of constraining managerial slack that is only partly offset by the conflicts of interest among
stakeholders. In other words, the governance activities of one stakeholder
generally yield positive net externalities to others. Second, through their
observable reactions, stakeholders convey signals and information regarding the corporation to each other. Each stakeholder has a distinct window
through which it observes the activities of the fum and each enjoys its own
set of alternative reactions when it detects an undesirable state of affairs.
The reactions of a stakeholder are in many cases observable by others who
will in tum choose among their own set of available reactions,29 Thus,
governance in the modem corporation is akin to a system of relays: stakeholders generate, collect, and analyze valuable information on managerial
slack, and then pass it to those stakeholders who are better situated to take
direct action to address the problem. Under the theory of interactive corporate governance, this system of interstakeholder signals permits information
gathered by dispersed stakeholders with concentrated expertise and hetero26. For a discussion of these mechanisms in the context of securities markets, see, e.g., Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms ofMarket Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 565, 59495 (1984).
27. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 2, at 3-4.
28. Id. at 30. The mechanisms that effect change inside the corporation in response to external
pressures are the subject of an increasingly sophisticated body of literature and should ultimately be
incorporated into the study of corporate governance. See, e.g., HARVEY LEIEENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM:
THE INEFFICIENCIES OF HIERARCHY (1987) (discussing decision-making within hierarchical internal
structure). For the purposes of this paper, however, these mechanisms operate within a black box that
responds to pressures created by the interactive governance of corporate stakeholders.
29. See Levrnore, supra note 21, at 69-72, 74-75 (arguing that the failure of a firm to pay a
dividend to preferred shareholders and enforcement by secured creditors communicates valuable
information to common shareholders).
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geneous perspectives on the firm's affairs to be communicated to those
stakeholders best able to correct the managerial slack. It is this interaction
among stakeholders who share governance responsibilities that distinguishes our theory from interdependent government theories that envision
crisp delegations of responsibility.30 In this sense, the interactive theory is
true to the contractual vision of the firm and yields a system that is in fact
far more effective in disciplining and correcting managerial slack than the
traditionally conceived model in which shareholders act as the sole principals for management.
In an effort to broaden the focus of American corporate governance
away from equityholders, we begin by demonstrating the role of debt in
interactive governance. In particular, we examine the role of debt through
the activities of a familiar institution: the commercial bank. As noted
above, the screening and monitoring skills of banks are well appreciated in
the literature. However, in the view of many governance scholars, the
effectiveness of the American commercial bank is impaired by the inherent
governance limitations of its financial instrument-debt-which is viewed
as excessively rigid compared to the nuanced governance tools of equity.31
For this reason, some commentators argue that the regulatory restrictions on
equity holdings by banks prevent them from serving meaningful governance roles. 32
We argue that debt is a potent and flexible governance instrument and
that banks are effective governance players. Other stakeholders benefit not
only from the ability of banks to deter and detect managerial slack by monitoring, but also from the actions taken by banks following the detection of
slack. A bank may respond by scaling down or terminating its relations
with the borrower (exit). Alternatively, the bank may use its threat of exit
to intervene in the decisions of the firm (voice). It may be tempting to think
that the bank plays a significant governance role only by exercising voice
and not when it abandons ship. For this reason, we are more intrigued by
the impact of bank exit on governance. The bank's exit may send an early
signal to other stakeholders that prompts them to act earlier than they might
have otherwise in order to correct slack.33 The value of exit is a unique
30. See infra text accompanying note 131.
31. See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 989-90; Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate
Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J. FIN. 567,579-81 (1988).
32. In this respect it is interesting that in some jurisdictions where such restrictions are absent,
banks do not hold stock in their borrowers to the full extent allowed by law. See Bernard S. Black &
John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92
MICH. L. REv. 1997,2074 (1994) (with respect to the U.K.); Ronald J. Daniels & Paul Halpern, The
Canadian Quandary: Accountingfor the Survival ofthe Closely Held Corporation, 25 CAN. Bus. L.J.
(forthcoming 1995) (with respect to Canada).
33. See generally Eli Ofek, Capital Structure and Firm Response to Poor Performance, 34 J. FIN.
EcoN. 3 (1993) (providing empirical support for proposition that highly leveraged firms respond earlier
to declines in firm value).
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insight of the interactive theory and it offers new explanations for contractual terms and legal rules that affect the ability to exit.
In Part IT, we discuss how several contractual and legal mechanisms
are structured to enhance the effectiveness of the signal that a bank's exit
sends to other stakeholders. We thereby suggest new motivations for debt
covenants and bankruptcy preference rules that have been missed in
existing scholarship and are illuminated by our theory of interactive corporate governance. In particular, covenants and events of default typically
define the start of a bank's contractual right to exit. Bankruptcy law provisions such as voidable preference rules and the automatic stay shut down
this right when the borrower becomes insolvent. Thus, the window of
opportunity for bank exit is defined by contract (covenants) and by statute
(bankruptcy law) to correspond to the period during which the signal sent
by exit is most valuable.
As stated above, one of the fundamental assumptions underlying the
theory of interactive corporate governance is that all stakeholders share the
goal of firm-value maximization. Even if all stakeholders do share a concern about managerial slack, their interests sometimes diverge, particularly
as the firm's financial condition deteriorates. This divergence provides an
explanation for the existence of rules that prevent one stakeholder from
benefiting at another stakeholder's expense in situations where it is likely
that conflicts of interests among stakeholders outweigh the benefits arising
from the signals sent by stakeholder action. In reacting to slack, an active
stakeholder's voice will reflect a self-interested bias. Thus, a bank may use
its threat of exit or its voice not only to redress slack, but also to obtain a
favorable renegotiation of the lending terms (for example, additional
collateral).
As we discuss in Part II, a lender who is perceived to control its borrower's decision-making and to have improved its position relative to other
creditors may not be permitted by law to realize such gains in a subsequent
exit. In contrast, despite the known bias of lenders in favor of conservative
strategies that may not be value-maximizing, the courts are prepared to permit the exercise of bank voice to influence firm decisions. We suggest that
this judicial restraint is desirable because, in many cases, the net benefit of
bank voice is positive, relative to the alternatives of leaving or moving control into the hands of other stakeholders. Moreover, the exercise of bank
voice prior to the firm's insolvency sends timely signals to other stakeholders who may then react to correct any slack.
In Part ill, we generalize the analysis of interactive governance across
a broader range of constituencies. Viewed across all stakeholders, the interactive theory leads to a deeper understanding of the organizational strength
of American corporate governance. It is a process that is triggered by the
early detection of managerial slack in any of the far reaches of the corporation. The information is passed through exit (and sometimes voice) signals
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to sophisticated stakeholders with the ability to take action to correct the
slack. 34 With the aid of two short case studies, we explore the channels by
which signals are communicated among stakeholders and the mechanisms
that evolve to decode signals that are unclear, often because they have been
clouded by competing interpretations offered by management. Finally, our
Conclusion suggests that further inquiry into the quantity and quality of
governance signals would contribute significantly to our understanding of
interactive corporate governance.
I
THE ROLE OF DEBT IN THE
INTERACTIVE GOVERNANCE PROCESS

As a governance mechanism, debt offers potent and flexible levers
over managerial decisions. Bank lenders provide the bulk of financing for
small- and medium-sized firms. As a result, they enjoy significant monitoring advantages over other stakeholders and can use their governance levers
to play the principal role in controlling managerial slack. 35 The other stakeholders, particularly creditors, benefit from the bank's active voice in management decisions and, to a large degree, they depend on it. The
dominance of bank lenders and the correlative dependency of other stakeholders on the bank is diluted substantially in larger, public corporations,
which are characterized by a more complex web of interactive stakeholder
monitoring and reaction functions. In this environment, a bank typically
exercises less voice in management but its exit provides a valuable contribution to corporate governance. As a first step toward understanding the
governance instruments and interactive roles of stakeholders other than
shareholders, this Part presents a stylized theory of the activities of bank
lenders in public corporations. As the Introduction states, the key to under34. Our interactive governance theory identifies the value of exit, but leaves a host of interesting
questions to be addressed by future analysis. A fundamental question is whether exit signals will tend to
be under- or over-supplied relative to an optimum. For example, employers and employees may try to
suppress or camouflage the real reason for the termination of an employment relationship, as may trade
creditors or banks and their debtors. In contrast, an employee, trade creditor, or bank may threaten to
exit publicly in order to extract more favorable terms from the firm. In order to make such a threat
credible, the stakeholder may have to cany it out on occasion. These are questions we touch on in Part
III to suggest several legal and institutional mechanisms that are evolving to enhance the effectiveness of
exit signals in corporate governance. However, as we acknowledge in the Conclusion, we leave much
of the analysis and institutional research to later work.
35. Robert Scott presents a governance model for young, expanding owner-operated firms that
obtain most oftheir capital from relational financers (typically banks), in which the financers take broad
security interests in order to enhance their leverage over their borrowers' decisions. Robert E. Scott, A
Relational Theory ofSecured Financing. 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901 (1986). The banks act as police who
walk the beat for the benefit of other creditors of their borrowers. ld. at 931. We extend Scott's thesis
to argue (I) that the beneficial monitoring and reaction activities of banks are also present, though
perhaps less directly, in firms with both debt and outside equity investors, and (2) that banks can
perform valuable governance functions even by terminating their relations with the firm.
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standing interactive governance is to appreciate the value of exit under various circumstances.
Large corporations with good reputations rely less on bank lending for
short- and medium-term debt capital and issue instead debt instruments
such as commercial paper and medium-term notes.36 This trend is viewed
by some as the eclipse of bank lending (other than to small businesses).37
Nevertheless, even the largest firms do not rely exclusively on public capital markets. Banks provide cash management and transaction services for
these firms. Moreover, although the market for high-yield, high-risk bonds
is vibrant once again, virtually all commercial paper continues to be investment grade.38 Therefore, issuers often need to back their commercial paper
with lines of credit from banks. In addition, bank lines of credit provide
liquidity insurance to the issuer in the event it cannot roll over its commercial paper upon maturity because, for instance, of a credit rating downgrade. 39 The issuer can rely on its relationship with its bank to secure new
financing without having to incur the cost (both out-of-pocket and delay in
time) of recertifying its credit worthiness to a new bank.
Banks enjoy well-known monitoring advantages listed below, of which
the latter two are more idiosyncratic to banks. First, by lending to a number
of different firms in the same industry or region, banks develop a broadly
based benchmark against which to evaluate the performance of each borrower. Second, banks usually lend short- or medium-term in order to match
assets with their principally short-term liabilities. The periodic renewals of
credit agreements provide opportunities for the acquisition and assessment
of new information about the condition of the firm. 40 Third, banks are able
to exploit economies of scope in the monitoring process by also providing
transaction and cash management services to the borrower. A borrower is
often required to keep compensating balances in a current account with its
bank lender. By inspecting the borrower's current account outflows and
36. See, e.g., Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Securitization, Risk, and the Liquidity Problem
in Banking, in STRUCIURAL CHANGE IN BANKING 227, 232 (Michael Klausner & Lawrence White eds.,
1993).
•
37. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond, Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice Between Bank Loans
and Directly Placed Debt, 99 J. POL. ECON. 689, 713 (1991) (concluding that firms with good credit
ratings can lower their cost of capital by borrowing directly in public debt markets).
38. See Calvin D. Schnure, Debt Maturity Choice and Risk-Free Assets: The "Clientele Effect"
and the Commercial Paper Market, FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES, No. 94-4 (Federal
Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.), April 1994, at 5-9.
39. For example, in light of the downgrading of its debt in 1993, General Motors Corporation
increased its available bank lines of credit as a financial cushion in the event that it would not be able to
either place enough new securities or renew the more than $20 billion in debt corning due that year.
Steven Lipin & Douglas Lavin, GMSeeking $24. 75 Billion Credit Line: 17 Banks Are Likely to Commit
Funds, WALL ST. J., March II, 1993, at A4.
40. Mitchell Berlin, Bank Loans and Marketable Securities: How Do Financial Contracts Control
Borrowing Firms?, Bus. REv., FED. REsERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, July-Aug. 1987, at 9;
Christopher James & Peggy Wier, Are Bank Loans Different?: Some Evidence From the Stock Market,
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1988, at 46, 52-53.
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inflows, the bank can learn both the identity of and levels of payments to
customers, suppliers, and employees.41 In this way, the bank can react
upon its discovery of delays and difficulties with the payments to or from
any of these constituents.42 Fourth, the documentation. supporting bank
debt requires the borrower to supply periodic information to assist the bank
in policing compliance with the typically extensive debt covenants (which
we discuss below). Moreover, a borrower usually undertakes to advise the
bank of any violation of its covenants. This communication is likely to be
more timely than public disclosure required under securities laws,43 largely
because banks are bound to adhere to the legal duty of confidentiality.44
This duty allows a borrower to provide valuable confidential information to
banks without fearing that it will be leaked to industry competitors.4s In
marked contrast, a borrower is much more reluctant to release information
to public debt investors and equity investors owing to the difficulties of
controlling the dissemination of such information.46
To be an effective player in corporate governance, a bank must not
only monitor the corporation, but it must also be able to act on the information it acquires. One action a lender can take is to exit. A lender has several means of exit from the corporate enterprise. It can limit its investment
in the borrower by refusing to provide additional financing or to make
future advances under existing credit facilities. It can also accelerate the
maturity of the outstanding debt, refuse to renew existing debt, and, if necessary, enforce its matured claim against the borrower's assets.
41. See Black, supra note 18, at 326 (noting infonnation advantages of banks); Fama, supra note
17, at 35-38 (same).
42. Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller argue that this advantage of bank monitoring is being
steadily eroded by technological innovation in monitoring processes and the rise of more cost-effective
independent data-processing services. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failure: The
Politicization ofa Social Problem. 45 STAN. L. REv. 289, 294-95 (1992) (book review). As a result, the
position of banks in the interactive governance of public corporations may be in flux and what we define
as the bank's role may soon be assumed by other stakeholders.
43. See infra note 53. Although the disclosUte obligation under securities law requires
management to release infonnation on a timely basis, management enjoys considerable latitude in
determining when the infonnation is ripe enough to be released. See generally Robert E. Verrecchia,
Discretionary Disclosure. 5 J. Acer. & EcoN. 179 (1983) (positing that managerial discretion in
disclosure is a function of disclosUte cost).

44. The common law duty of confidentiality that banks owe to customers was enunciated in
Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank of England, 1 K.B. 461,480 (1924) (noting that implied
tenn of bank's contract with its customers is that bank will not divulge infonnation concerning
customer's accounts to third parties). On the importance of the confidentiality feature to the role of
banks as a financial intennediary, see Benston & Smith, supra note 18, at 219-23; CampbeIl, supra note
18, at 921.
45. The confidentiality restriction, however, may impede somewhat the communication of
information necessary to clarify signals in an interactive model.

46. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 290-92 (1991) (discussing appropriability problems related to release of finn-specific
information). For concerns of confidentiality, see also Campell, supra note 18, at 920-2\.
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Bank exit creates a sense of urgency among management and the
board of directors that motivates corrective action.47 The impact of bank
exit upon management is a function of the amount of indebtedness to the
bank and the abruptness of the bank's exit. To be effective, the consequences of exit must be strong enough to deter slack ex ante or to induce
correction ex post, but not so devastating as to eliminate any opportunity for
change.48 In some cases, even repentant managers have difficulty finding
new financing for their :finn after the withdrawal of their main bank.
Moreover, if the bank's exit is observable outside the circles of the :finn's
management and the board, it may prompt similar exit by other creditors.49
This situation may precipitate the :finn's collapse before management has
the opportunity to remedy the performance lapse.
However, several factors reduce the risk of such a collapse. First, borrowers reduce their vulnerability to bank exit to some extent by diversifying
away from bank financing. Second, as we discuss later, the laws of voidable preferences and the bankruptcy stay on creditor enforcement encourage
early exit. Third, an expanding group of sophisticated investors specialize
in lending to troubled enterprises and purchasing distressed debt securities. so Fourth, the availability of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings offers
management a way to forestall the collapse and correct its slack under the
close scrutiny of its creditors and the bankruptcy court.Sl
Although exit is an attractive option for those stakeholders for whom
exit entails low cost, not all stakeholders will choose to or be able to exit.
Thus, exit by some stakeholders may induce the remaining or new stakeholders to exercise voice instead. Exit is more costly for stakeholders who
have made significant relation-specific investments. These stakeholders
may provide the financial support for the continuation of the :finn and the
lender's exit may be the catalyst for their intervention in the governance of
the:finn. The bank's exit may also prompt institutional shareholders to
intervene if their exit is constrained by the size of their investments. A
47. In a similar vein, Michael Jensen refers to debt as a "powerful agent for change" because, if
managers cannot meet their interest obligations out of the firm's cash flow, they are forced to rethink
their strategy and structure. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse ofthe Public Corporation, HARv. Bus. REv.,
Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61, 67; see also Karen H. Wruck, Financial Distress. Reorganization, and
Organizational Efficiency. 27 J. FIN. ECON. 419, 430-35 (1990) (analyzing the effect of financial
distress on organizational efficiency). The tendency of boards to become more activist when the
corporation is perceived to be in crisis is well established in the empirical literature describing board
behavior. See. e.g.• JAY W. leRSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMEIuCA'S CORPORATE
BOARDS, 141-67 (1989); MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 27-39 (1971).
48. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 2, at 22-25.
49. Many debt instruments have clauses which trigger default if the borrower defaults under any
other debt contract (cross-default clauses). In addition, a public company may have to report significant
defaults as a material change under its securities law disclosure obligation. See infra note 53.
50. See. e.g., EDWARD I. ALTMAN, DISTRESSED SECURITIES: ANALYZING AND EVALUATING
MARKET POTENTIAL AND INVESTMENT RISK (1991).
51. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1085 1995

1086

CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1073

bank's exit is often a higWy observable signal of managerial slack. 52 Public
corporations are required by securities laws to disclose most instances of
exit by a prominent lender. 53 As suggested above, the bank's exit may
prompt some existing shareholders for whom exit is difficult to intervene in
the management of the firm. 54 On the other hand, a borrower's smaller
shareholders for whom exit is less costly may respond to bank exit by selling their interests in security markets. However, their exit creates incentives for entry by new shareholders who are skilled and willing to intervene
to correct the slack in the firm's performance.55 Similarly, the bank's exit
provides an opportunity for another lender to step in. A lender with expertise in rehabilitating deteriorating enterprises may be attracted by the pre52. The transfer of infonnation may also work in the opposite direction. James Booth provides
empirical evidence that the cost of bank loans is lower when there is public trading of shares in the
borrower. He claims that this is the result of the information produced by the observable prices from the
market trades, reports by securities analysts, filing requirements, audits, and public announcements.
Booth also finds that the cost of bank borrowing is reduced if the finn has rated, investment-grade public
debt outstanding, particularly if the public debt is of lower priority. He attributes this reduction in cost
to the monitoring and infonnation produced by bond-rating agencies. James R. Booth, Contract Costs,
Bank Loans, and the Cross-Monitoring Hypothesis, 31 J. FIN. EeoN. 25, 27-28, 36-41 (1992).
53. The duty to disclose changes in the issuer's banking arrangements derives from a number of
different sources. Under § 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1994), the
Securities and Exchange Commission is entitled to require issuers to make such filings as are "necessary
or appropriate for the proper protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in the security:' 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(a) (1994). Pursuant to this authority, the Commission requires issuers to file with it periodic
(annual and quarterly) forms detailing the financial status of the issuer and, where appropriate, Fonn 8K reports that advise investors of current changes. Dennis J. Block et aI., Affirmative Duty to Disclose
Material Information Concerning Issuer's Financial Condition and Business Plans, 40 Bus. LAW. 1243,
1244-48 (1985). Apart from these explicit reporting requirements, issuers are also required to disclose
information to investors pursuant to the anti-fraud rules set out in Rule IOb-5. Id. at 1248-55. In
tandem, these requirements have been interpreted by the Commission as requiring "full and prompt
announcements of material facts regarding the company's financial condition:' Timely Disclosure of
Material Corporate Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 34-8995, 35 Fed. Reg. 16,733 (Oct. 29,
1970). Finally, stock exchange listing requirements stipulate that issuers must make timely disclosure.
Block, supra, at 1255-57. Block notes, for example, that the ASE guidelines require "immediate public
disclosure of all material information:' Id. at 1255-56 (citing American Stock Exchange Company
Guide § 401(a), reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,I24A, at 17,097-98). For a general
discussion of the scope of the securities disclosure obligation, see Block, supra, at 1243-57.
Discussions with officials at the American and New York exchanges confinned that pursuant to
these obligations issuers routinely disclose to the public changes in banking arrangements, including
defaults (both technical and material), terminations of or revisions to existing credit arrangements, and,
where substantial, entry into new banking relationships.
54. Levrnore describes how secured creditors in particular serve this function:
Secured creditors that monitor their collateralized assets can provide "signals" about the
financial stability of the finn to its outside shareholders...• Shareholders (or directors) beset
by monitoring difficulties will, for example, find it relatively easy to note instances ofjudicial
foreclosure, repossession or disposition of collateral.
Levrnore, supra note 21, at 69-70 (footnotes omitted).
55. This entry by "skilled" shareholders may explain the empirical observation by Gilson that
financial distress is accompanied by an increase in the proportion of common stock held by blockholders
(defined as investors holding stakes of at least 5%), who consolidate outstanding shares. Stuart C.
Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders, 27 J. FIN. EeoN. 355, 379-84 (1990). There is
also typically an increase in the percentage of outside board seats held by these blockholders. ld. at
370-79.
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mium it will receive for turning around the firm. In sum, bank exit may
provide the stimulus for constructive change either directly by its immediate impact on management and the board, or indirectly by inducing the
exercise of voice by other stakeholders.
A bank that detects managerial slack will not always choose to exit.
Instead, the bank may defer exit and use the threat of exit as a lever to
intervene in the firm's decisions. The leverage confers considerable discretion on the bank in its exercise of voice.56 The bank's choice between exit
and voice is based on a self-interested evaluation of the relative net benefits
from each option. A bank that exits enjoys the benefit of a more certain
recovery of its investment. However, it bears transaction and regulatory
costs of exit,57 incurs search and transaction costs in entering into new lending arrangements, and may forgo the opportunity to finance a revitalized
borrower in the future. In addition, bank management may be reluctant to
abandon a sunk investment, even if a prospective cost-benefit calculation
favors exit.58
On the other side of the ledger, the gains from voice are a function of
the ability to influence management and thereby improve firm performance.
In exercising its voice, the bank can draw on expertise and information
acquired in the monitoring stage. In addition, it may hold sufficient debt to
have an incentive to intervene on its own without facing the obstacles to
collective action that impede the exercise of governance rights by other
diffuse stakeholder groups. In particular, whereas dispersed shareholders
may be unable to discipline management effectively through their voting
rights, a bank with a large enough investment will have sufficient incentive
to intervene effectively. Most significantly, as a debtholder, the bank has a
very credible exit threat which gives it leverage over the borrower's decisions. However, the relatively low cost of exit that makes the bank threat
credible also reduces the bank's incentive to postpone exit and exercise
voice.59 Therefore, the bank's self-interest may dictate exit even in circum56. See Alexander J. Triantis & George G. Triantis, Conversion Rights and the Design of
Financial Contracts. 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1231, 1252-54 (1994). Compare Oliver WiIIiarnson's comment

that debt imposes a rule-governed regime, in contrast to the more adaptable controls of equity.
WiIIiarnson, supra note 31, at 580-81 (arguing that "equity is more forgiving than debt"). WiIIiarnson
understates the potential in debt for nuanced governance, given the discretion ofthe lender in extending
financing, renewing credit, or accelerating maturity.
57. For instance, when a bank caIls a loan, it attracts the attention ofregulators and rnay be forced
to accept a write-down of its assets that, in tum, impacts on its capital base. For discussion of capitaladequacy regulation, see JONATHAN R. MAcEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 284-87 (1992).
58. See generally ALLAN I. TEGER, Too MUCH INVESTED TO QUIT (1980) (describing psychology
of conflict escalation); Glen Whyte, Escalating Commitment to a Course ofAction: A Reinterpretation.
11 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 311 (1986) (analyzing alternative explanations for escalating commitments to
losing courses of action).
59. Hirschman observes that the availability of an exit option reduces the wiIIingness to develop
and use the voice mechanism. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 2, at 44-54. Consider the foIlowing three
examples. First, a lender with a security interest in real estate can enforce its debt with little difficulty.
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stances where its voice would be a more effective governance tool in correcting managerial slack. Nevertheless, as we note above, the bank's exit
has value in prompting the intervention of other constituencies who may
have a positive impact on firm performance.
In sum, bank monitoring and reaction may correct managerial slack
either directly, by precipitating a crisis in the boardroom and exercising
voice, or indirectly, by exiting and providing a signal for the intervention of
others. 60 The bank's multifaceted role in governance illuminates a variety
of relations with other stakeholders that range from dependency to interaction. To be sure, not all stakeholders are active participants in the interactive process. Some rely on the actions of others to deter misbehavior and
correct slack, and their relationship to active governance players is simply
one of dependency. For example, consider investors in a firm's publicly
issued debt. Public debt is issued under a trust indenture which contains the
terms of the debt contract and appoints a trustee to represent the interests of
the disparate debtholders. Despite the similarity in the default risks in bank
and public debt, the typical covenant in public debt protects the debtholder
to a much lesser degree than the typical covenant in commercial bank
debt. 61 In addition, the indentures often limit the responsibility of the trustTherefore, its dominant strategy is to exit when it detects an event ofdefault that reflects deteriomtion in
the firm's performance. Yet, the ease of exit also enhances the credibility of the secured lender's exit
threat, which it might have used to induce profitable change in the management of the borrower.
Second, an unsecured lender must invoke the relatively cumbersome mechanism of judicial debt
enforcement in order to recover its investment. While this may deter the lender from exiting, it also
deprives it of effective voice. As a final example, suppose the bank's debt is secured by a floating lien
over inventory and accounts receivables. Inventory and receivables are usually marketable collateml
and therefore the bank's exit is relatively easy. However, the credit an inventory or receivables lender
extends will expand and contract with the business of the borrower. As a result, the lender who exits
forgoes the opportunity to finance an expanding borrower should the problem of performance lapse be
corrected. Given this cost of exit, the intervention of the inventory or receivables financer is likely to be
more effective than that of the unsecured lender and, at the same time, the former is also more likely
than the real estate lender to postpone exit and intervene to correct managerial slack.
60. For instance, in his study 0000 publicly tmded companies in the period 1974 to 1983, James
found that stock prices reacted positively to announcements of bank debt-financing armngements, while
they fell upon announcements of other credit armngements, notably public straight-debt offerings and
privately placed debt. Christopher James, Some Evidence on the Uniqueness ofBank Loans. 19 J. FIN.
EcON. 217, 225-26, 231-34 (1987). While these results suggest that the activities of banks may benefit
shareholders, they do not distinguish among, for example, the screening, monitoring, and governance
roles of banks. In a subsequent article, Lummer and McConnell refined James' methodology to
distinguish between the effects of announcements by banks of new and revised (including renewed) loan
agreements. They found that most of the positive effects on share prices were due to favomble
announcements of revisions of existing financing armngements. On this basis, the authors conclude that
the benefit to shareholders is derived from the bank's access to private information acquired during its
relationship with the borrower, mther than its advantage in screening the borrower at the time of the
initial financing. Scott 1. Lummer & John J. McConnell, Further Evidence on the Bank Lending
Process and the Capital-Market Response to Bank Loan Agreements. 25 J. FIN. ECON. 99, 120-21
(1989).
61. See Robert M. Lloyd, Financial Covenants in Commercial Loan Documentation: Uses and
Limitations. 58 TENN. 1. REv. 335, 338-39 n.l2 (1991) (listing three possible explanations for the lesser
protections acquired by public debt holders); Martin Riger, The Trust Indenture as Bargained Contract:
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ees to monitor the lender's compliance with even the few covenants that are
present.62 Both the weakness of covenant patterns and the passivity of
trustees is well known. However, a satisfactory explanation of the disparity
in this respect between public debt and bank debt has eluded commentators
because they have neglected to consider the interdependency between banks
and public debtholders in corporate governance. 63
Suppose a fum has a bank lender and public debtholders who are represented by their trustee. To keep the problem simple, assume that the bank
debt and publicly issued debt have the same principal amount, maturity, and
liquidation priority. To the extent that the covenants and monitoring of one
lender deter misbehavior by the borrower, they benefit all debtholders.
Therefore, if the bank knows that the trustee is monitoring, the bank will
not duplicate the trustee's monitoring activity because its action would be
of no additional value in deterring misbehavior, and vice versa. We assume
for the moment that monitoring is a homogeneous activity in that the parties
share the same perspective on the fum. Then, in equilibrium, only one of
the two parties will engage in monitoring.64 However, while the equilibrium involves single-creditor monitoring, which creditor will monitor is
indeterminate. The identity of the monitoring creditor is important whenever the two creditors' monitoring costs differ. The lower-cost monitor
should engage in the monitoring activity. As a result of the informational
advantages described above,65 banks are usually lower-cost monitors than
indenture trustees, even when the latter are departments within banks. 66 If
bank-monitoring equilibrium is obviously preferable to trustee monitoring,
The Persistence ofMyth, 16 J. CORP. L. 211 (1991) (chronicling the competing interests that create the
relatively poor protection of public debtholders).
62. See Riger, supra note 61, at 218-19 and n.38. The passivity of trustees was also one of the
subjects of inquiry by the Douglas Committee in the mid-1930s. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, REpORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND
FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, pt. VI (June 18, 1936) (hereinafter SEC
REpORT).
63. Commentators have provided several explanations. First, indenture terms are settled between
the issuer and the underwriter, neither of whom has any financial or legal interest to insert extensive
covenants for the benefit of future holders of the securities. See, e.g., SEC REpORT, supra note 62, at 56, 9-10; Riger, supra note 61, at 218-19 (noting that the trustee's duty to protect shareholder interest
only arises upon default). Second, the relative financial stability of the largest borrowers between the
mid-1970s and mid-1980s lulled investors into a false sense of security. See, e.g., William W. Bratton,
Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time ofRestructuring. 1989 DUKE LJ. 92, 14142. Third, institutional investors shifted their investment policy from a buy-and-hold to a trading
strategy and thereby became indifferent to the underlying nature of contractual protections. See, e.g.,
RICHARD BROOK, DEBT COVENANTS AND EVENT RISK: THE PRACTITIONER AS A SOURCE OF EVIDENCE,
Columbia Center for Law and Economics Studies Working Paper No. 51 (1990).
64. The two Nash equilibria are the bank monitors and the trustee does not, and vice versa. See
generally Picker, supra note 19, at 664-69 (1992) (recognizing that any situation where both or neither
monitored would be unstable); Alan Schwartz, The ContinUing Puzzle ofSecured Debt, 37 VAND. L.
REv. 1051, 1056-57 (1984) (same).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
66. An additional advantage is arguably that the bank does not suffer from a collective-action
problem in reacting to unfavorable information about the firm. The trustee is a fiduciary who typically
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the creditors themselves may focus on this equilibrium. 67 Once it is
reached there is no incentive to depart from it. Creditors pass on their monitoring costs to borrowers in the form of higher interest rates or fees. Given
that borrowers bear the aggregate of their debtholders' monitoring costs,
they will seek to ensure that the bank acts as monitor by appropriately structuring the terms of their debt contracts.
Debt issuers ensure that the bank does the monitoring, and not the
trustee on behalf of public debtholders, by limiting the covenants and
trustee obligations in public debt indentures. 68 As a result, the bank knows
that the trustee has few, if any, covenants to monitor and a diluted incentive
to monitor due to the low standard of care. Therefore, the bank will carry
out its monitoring function. To the extent that it deters borrower misbehavior, the bank's monitoring inures to the benefit of public debtholders as
well. In turn, the existence of a bank lender is a signal to debt investors that
restrictive covenants are in place and that the firm's activities are being
monitored. Therefore, they make a voluntary and fully informed decision
to purchase debt instruments with limited covenant protection.
In the discussion thus far, we have argued that to the extent that lender
monitoring, exit, and voice control managerial slack, these actions benefit
all stakeholders. However, in other respects, the interests of the bank and
other stakeholders diverge. In the economic model of the corporation,
financial agency problems exist because, as agents of their shareholders,
managers have incentives to make decisions that transfer wealth from
debtholders to shareholders. Indeed, the exit rights of debtholders deter this
type of borrower misbehavior. To the extent that managers respond to bank
influence, however, the bank is, in turn, an imperfect agent of the other
stakeholders. Although it contributes to the correction of managerial slack,
the bank also has incentives to use its considerable monitoring advantage
and its leverage over firm decisions to enhance its position at the expense of
other stakeholders.
In the remainder of this Part, we review four types of bank actions that
produce interstakeholder conflict. First, the bank may exit early for reasons
unrelated to managerial slack: for instance, to escape an unfavorable deal
with the borrower. Second, the bank may be lax in its monitoring and react
too late to evidence of slack. Third, when the bank detects a deterioration
in the borrower's financial condition, the bank may use its exit threat to
improve the terms of its debt. Fourth, the bank may intervene to correct
slack but, at the same time, may also imprint its own preferences on the
must wait for instructions from a vote of debtholders. However, there seems to be no obstacle to a
trustee being given discretion to make the reaction decision without consulting the debtholders.
67. See DAVID M. KREps, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 410-17 (1990).
68. This theory presents an alternative to Randal Picker's proposal that the indeterminacy of Nash
equilibria in a two-creditor monitoring subgame may be resolved by awarding contingent monitoring
payments to one creditor, so that the designated creditor is compensated only for the monitoring costs
that it actually incurs. Picker, supra note 19, at 664-69.
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business decisions of the firm. The agency costs in each of the four categories are often outweighed by the benefits ofthe bank's exit signal in the first
three instances and the bank's voice in the fourth. Moreover, we observe
that market and legal mechanisms exist that mitigate the most serious
instances of conflict-instances of asset-grabbing that do not convey valuable information. These protective mechanisms discourage inefficient exit
and voice, and thereby enhance the net benefits from the role of bank lenders in interactive corporate governance.

A. Lender Exits Early for Reasons Unrelated to Managerial Slack
A lender's exit is different in nature from that of a holder of traded
debt or equity. The latter investor can exit without interacting with the
firm, by selling its interests in an established market. The cost of premature
exit is borne by the sellers of those securities. Typically, a bank cannot exit
simply by dealing with a third party.69 Therefore, the lender and borrower
negotiate the terms of the bank's exit at the time of contracting. They agree
to the conditions upon which the lender is entitled to cut off financing, to
demand repayment of the outstanding debt, and to enforce its debt against
the assets of the borrower.
The lender's exit rights provide an important discipline on managerial
slack. They also constrain the ability of other stakeholders, particularly
shareholders, to capture the loyalty of management to the detriment of
debtholders (borrower misbehavior). In its contract with the borrower, a
lender could retain unconditional discretion to exercise any or all of its exit
options'?o However, the lender may subsequently use its discretionary right
of exit for strategic purposes unrelated to managerial slack or borrower misbehavior. One example of such lender opportunism is where a bank terminates its contract with the borrower to escape a deal that has become
unfavorable for exogenous reasons such as a rise in the risk-free rate of
interest in the case of a fixed-rate loan. The lender's contractual rate of
69. There is a new and growing market for bank loans, even high-risk and high-yield loans.
Dennis McCrary & Jo Ousterhout, The Development and Future ofthe Loan Sales Market. J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN., Fall 1989, at 74. However, loans are typically sold shortly after they are made and the
borrowers are not in financial distress. See id. at 75 (describing reduced role of many banks as
"holders" of loans, and increased role as originators). Banks are discouraged from seIling loans
midstream by an accounting rule issued by the Federal Accounting Standards Board ("FASB'') in 1993,
FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115. When a bank sells a loan before its
maturity, the FASB rule forces the bank to value the entire portfolio of loans at current prices, rather
than at their original cost. See Lee Berton, Banks Anticipate the Crunch ofNew Accounting Rule. WALL
ST. J., Jan. 5, 1995, at B4.
70. For example, a lender may make a demand loan or may reserve the right to accelerate maturity
whenever it deems itself to be insecure. However this right is limited to the degree that the Uniform
Commercial Code imposes a good faith requirement on acceleration. See U.C.C. § 1-208 (1990). For
the distinction between a commitment to advance funds and a line of credit under which the lender
retains discretion to advance, see Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. Commonwealth Gen., Ltd., 386 So. 2d 31,
33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that a line of credit does not impart to the bank legal responsibility
to loan up to the limit of the line).
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return likely will be discounted ex ante by the expected cost to the borrower
of the potential for lender opportunism or costly contractual terms may be
chosen to reduce the incentive for opportunistic exit (for example, a floating
interest rate).
There are several market and legal constraints on lender opportunism.
First, banks receive higher interest rates than other debt investors at least
partly because other constituencies can rely on bank monitoring, exit, and
voice to serve their collective interest. When a bank is a repeat player, this
premium would be compromised by observable opportunistic abuse of its
acceleration rights. However, the effectiveness of the reputational sanction
depends on the ability of the market to distinguish opportunistic bank exit
from exit that is justified by a loss of confidence in the management of the
borrower. Second, while courts generally respect contract provisions giving
lenders discretion to cut back or terminate financing at any time,71 they
have at times fettered the lender's exit options by requiring that the lender
act in good faith and give the borrower reasonable notice before exit.72 The
notice and good faith requirements reduce the risk of lender opportunism.
However, the courts are no better, and are probably worse, than the market
in distinguishing between cases of opportunistic lender behavior and circumstances where lenders are reacting to managerial slack or borrower misbehavior. As a result, an evolving doctrine of lender liability would impede
the lender's ability to respond to misbehavior by exiting or threatening to
exit, and thereby raise the cost of bank credit.73 Indeed, in light of the
positive governance externalities of bank activities, such judicial intervention would have a broader adverse effect on the cost of capital generally.
71. See, e.g.• Kham & Nate's Shoes No.2, Inc., v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1354,
1357-59 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying equitable subordination where bank exercised contractual right to
terminate financing at any time on five days' notice); In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 693,
695,700 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding that lender did not act inequitably in exercising right under line of
credit agreement to reduce advance ratio for inventory by 5% per month).
72. For instance, in the case ofK.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985), the
parties agreed to a $3.5 million line of credit facility under which all advances by the lender were
discretionary and outstanding loans were payable on demand. The Sixth Circuit held that the lender had
an obligation to give notice before refusing to advance funds under the line of credit and a duty to act in
good faith in demanding repayment of outstanding amounts. ld. at 759-60. But see Kham & Nate's
Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1358 (holding that bank need not give any more notice than its contract requires).
The discretion ofa lender to accelerate the maturity of the indebtedness at will or when it deems itself to
be insecure is subject to a requirement that the lender must at the time of acceleration believe in good
faith that the prospect of the borrower's repayment is impaired. U.C.C. § 1-208 (1990). Contra U.C.C.
§ 1-208 Official Comment (stating that § 1-208 does not apply to demand instruments or obligations
that by their very nature permit call at any time for any reason); National Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v.
Ross, 130 B.R. 656, 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), afl'd sub nom. Yaeger v. National Westminster, 962
F.2d 1 (2d Cir. (N.Y.) 1992); Spencer Companies, Inc., v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 81 B.R. -194,
199 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
73. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics ofLender Liability. 99 YALE L.J. 131, 143-44 (1989)
(noting that notice requirements, ostensibly designed to curb opportunistic behavior by lenders, may end
up encouraging opportunistic behavior by borrowers).
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In order to reduce the scope of lender opportunism, the parties often
condition the bank's right to accelerate the maturity of a loan on the occurrence of an event of default specified in the contract, rather than leaving the
right to the lender's discretion?4 Default may be triggered by the borrower's failure to meet its payment obligations or by its violation of any
other covenant in the debt contract. Current corporate scholarship explains
covenants as a means of bonding the commitment of the :firm to refrain
from behavior that redistributes wealth from debtholders to shareholders or
from investors as a group to managers. 75 These covenants restrict actions
such as shareholder distributions, issuance of senior or secured debt, and
combinations with other corporations. If a loan agreement contains restrictive covenants and the lender diligently monitors compliance by the borrower, all investors benefit from the consequent deterrence of misbehavior.
While debt covenants are well understood as bonding mechanisms,
they are much less appreciated for the role they play in triggering investor
activism. They serve as trip wires for the lender's right to accelerate and
enforce or to intervene in the borrower's decisions. The function is perhaps
most apparent in covenants that impose financial ratio tests on borrowers
and require periodic reporting. 76 The covenants in bank loan agreements
are usually designed to be tripped well before the borrower either misses a
payment or becomes insolvent. Therefore, by being immediately notified
of the borrower's financial difficulties, the lender has the opportunity to act
well before the borrower becomes insolvent. If a lender exits, its action
sends a signal that an event of default may have been triggered by either a
payment default or a covenant violation. Consistent with the interactive
nature of corporate governance, stakeholders who observe the signal are on
notice that closer investigation of the firm's condition may be in order.
Thus, depending on the lender's reaction, covenants are valuable in either
triggering its intervention or in enhancing its exit signal.
Nevertheless, covenants are imperfect predictors of when bank exit or
intervention is optimal: a trip wire may be triggered because of an exogenous shock to the firm rather than managerial slack. When a lender detects
a violation, it has the right to accelerate, but no legal obligation to do so.
The bank has several options: to accelerate the maturity, to grant a period
of grace, to waive the default, or to modify the covenant to eliminate the
default. Covenants reduce, but do not eliminate, the scope for lender oppor74. Many lending agreements combine specific events of default with a provision allowing the
lender to accelerate when it deems itself insecure or its collateral to be in jeopardy. However, partly for
reputational reasons and partly because of the risk of liability mentioned above, see supra note 72 and
accompanying text, lenders much prefer to accelerate following the occurrence of a specified event of
default.
75. See, e.g., Clifford W. Smith, Jr., & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis
ofBond Covenants, 7. J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979).
76. Indeed, banks should perceive a borrower's failure to meet reporting requirements as an early
sign of trouble.
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tunism. The lender may still use its acceleration right on a false alarm to
escape a bad deal (for example, when the market rate of interest has risen
since the agreement) or to extract concessions from the debtor. 77

B. Lender Reacts Too Late
Like any other stakeholder, a bank lender has the incentive to free-ride
on the monitoring and reactions of others. As a result, a bank might not
detect managerial slack until the problem is too severe to be corrected.
However, the spoils from a deteriorating firm are divided among unsecured
creditors on a first-come-first-served basis. Therefore, an unsecured creditor wi11likely shirk in its monitoring function only to the point that it can
still detect the impending failure of the firm before other creditors. It may
use its information advantage to ensure that it is first in line, rather than to
police the behavior of management. As a result, managerial slack is insufficiently deterred and intervention by other stakeholders is triggered too
late.78
Bankruptcy law, however, threatens to penalize this type of strategy.
Even if a lender is first in line among its borrower's creditors, it may not be
able to exit after the debtor has become insolvent. If an unsecured bank
lender receives payment or enforces its claim within 90 days before bankruptcy and the debtor is insolvent at the time ofthe transfer, the transfer is a
voidable preference and the bankruptcy trustee can recover the payment
from the bank to the extent the bank was undersecured. 79 The conventional
explanation for preference law is that it deters asset-grabbing on the eve of
bankruptcy.8o However, this theory does not explain why the debtor must
be insolvent at the time of the payment to the creditor. The interactive
theory supplies a more complete explanation. The voidable preference rule
encourages timely monitoring and pre-insolvency action by threatening to
reverse any attempt to exit after the debtor has become insolvent. Although
the rule tends to underdeter preferences by insolvent debtors,8! it provides
77. See infra Part II.C.
78. The demise of Olympia & York may be partly explained in this manner. The firs! signal of
financial trouble appeared in the market for the firm's commercial paper, rather than from its banks.
Many observers felt that its main bank, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, had been caught
asleep at the wheel. See, e.g., Jacquie McNish, How Banks Flubbed 0 & Y, THE GLOBE & MAIL
(foronto ed.), Dec. 4, 1992, at AI.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994). Section 547(b)(3) requires that the transfer must be made while
the debtor is insolvent. Insolvency is defined by a balance sheet test in II U.S.C. § 101(32) (1994): the
sum of the firm's debts is greater than the fair value of its nonexempt property, other than property
transferred, concealed or removed with intent to hinder, delay or defraud the firm's creditors. The
debtor is presumed to have been insolvent in the 90-day period prior to bankruptcy. II U.S.C. § 547(f)
(1994).
80. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson,Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725, 756-61
(1984).
.
81. At the time of the transfer from the insolvent debtor, there is a chance that bankruptcy will not
occur within 90 days. Moreover, interest on the amount transferred runs only from the time the
bankruptcy trustee challenges the transfer. At most, therefore, the operation of the rule simply restores
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some incentive to a lender to observe early warning signs and to blow the
whistle before the debtor becomes insolvent. 82 This incentive is important
because the signal from a bank is of little value after the onset of insolvency
since other creditors are often already aware of the insolvency through their
respective interactions with the debtor. If the bank does not signal before
the :firm becomes insolvent, it has in a sense failed its monitoring role and is
compelled to participate in the loss-sharing in bankruptcy.
On the other hand, transfers to fully secured lenders within the 90-day
period before bankruptcy are not voidable preferences and therefore the
secured lender's incentive to act early is weaker. 83 Moreover, the secured
lender is assured of its priority position and does not participate in the race
to the courthouse. However, a secured lender who fails to notice or act on
early signs of distress may nevertheless be penalized. If bankruptcy is initiated before the lender enforces its security, the lender is subject to the automatic stay on the exercise of enforcement rights,84 entitled to interest only
to the extent it is oversecured,85 and may ultimately be compelled to compromise its claim in a reorganization plan. 86 Indeed, in certain circumstances a secured creditor may be required to return repossessed collateral
to the debtor. 87 This authority may be explained in the interactive model as
providing an incentive to a secured creditor to move early enough to ensure
that it completes both repossession and sale before the initiation of bankruptcy. Arguably, the case law also recognizes that, in some cases, the
mere repossession of collateral may not be as clear a signal to other stakeholders as its sale.88
In sum, bankruptcy law provides unsecured lenders and, to a lesser but
still significant extent, secured lenders with incentives to monitor diligently
and to act upon early evidence of deterioration. If the bank acts early
enough and conspicuously enough, it leaves to the other investors the possithe status quo. John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy. Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression ofDoubt.
67 VA. L. REv. 249, 264-65 (1981).
82. Alternatively, if the bank fails to move before the debtor becomes insolvent, the bank may
protect its payment by propping up the debtor for 90 days and concealing the firm's financial distress.
However, the bank runs the risk that other creditors will make independent observations of the debtor's
condition and petition the firm into bankruptcy before the end of the 90-day period. Therefore, the
optimal ex ante strategy may be to detect financial distress and react before the debtor becomes
insolvent.
83. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1994) (transfer is preferential only if it enables the creditor to
receive more than it would receive in liquidation under Chapter 7).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (1994).
85. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994).
86. See 11 U.s.C. § 1129(b) (1994). The secured creditor also faces a significant degree of
uncertainty about its payoff in bankruptcy.
87. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
88. The secured creditor is obliged to give notice, to the debtor and to other creditors with security
interests in the collateral, of its intention to resell the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1990). The usual
explanation for this notice provision is that it improves the ability of other creditors to monitor the sale
of the collateral. See id. at cmt. 5.
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bility of resolving the firm's troubles before the onset of bankruptcy.
Indeed, if sent early enough, the bank's signal may be received by more
skilled governance players who can instigate the desired change more efficiently than the bank. However, if the signal is sent too late to prevent
bankruptcy, the bank will be forced to share in the loss as a consequence of
the failure to detect managerial slack early enough for the slack to be
corrected.
C.

Lender Uses Its Leverage to Improve the Terms ojIts Debt

A lender may choose to defer exit and instead use its threat of exit to
induce management to renegotiate the terms of the debt. This strategy is
successful only to the extent that the lender's threat is credible, which in
turn depends on the cost of exit to the lender. 89 Moreover, the borrower
enjoys its own exit options, which limit the potential gains from lender
opportunism: it can :find a new lender or it may file for bankruptcy protection. 90 Therefore, the value that is appropriable by the first lender is
capped by the cost to the bqrrower of obtaining replacement :financing91 and
the lender will not press the debtor too hard if the lender stands to lose
value in bankruptcy.
Since monetary concessions either involve cash payments or an
increase in fixed obligations, they increase the risk of the borrower's insolvency. Therefore, lenders often request nonmonetary adjustments such as
convertibility options, warrants, or more restrictive covenants as conditions
for waiving defaults or granting periods of grace. Frequently, they seek to
improve their position by taking new or additional security interests or
guarantees. However, to bypass the preference rule in bankruptcy, both the
issuance and perfection of new security must occur either outside the
90-day period before bankruptcy or while the debtor is still solvent. 92
Furthermore, the modification of a debt contract is often a material change
in the borrower's condition that must be disclosed by public issuers under
securities laws. 93 Additionally, the perfection of a security interest issued
by the debtor is a public act which requires either possession of the collatSee supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
90. The lender may have a good faith duty to give the borrower reasonable time to find
replacement financing. See discussion supra note 72. The protection of the automatic stay and the
availability of debtor-in-possession financing provide the incentive for cash-strapped borrowers to file
for bankruptcy. See George G. Triantis, A Theory ofthe Regulation ofDebtor-in-Possession Financing.
46 VAND. 1. REv. 901 (1993).
91. Fischel, supra note 73, at 138 ("The size of any concessions must be smaller than the costs to
the debtor of negotiating with a new lender.").
92. Within the 90-day period, an insolvent debtor cannot grant a security interest to its lender
unless the lender contemporaneously extends new credit. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(c)(1) (1994).
93. A corporation is required under securities laws to disclose significant modifications in its
agreements with lenders, including the issuance of new security interests. See supra note 53.
89.
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eral or filing with a state agency.94 Other stakeholders may be prompted by
such a signal to exit or intervene to control managerial slack. Indeed, the
prospect of a concession may serve as an inducement to the bank to monitor
and, if contained, it may be a relatively modest price to pay for a signal that
triggers the remedial interactive governance process. 95
In the discussion thus far, the lender receives a concession from the
borrower in response to the lender's simple threat of exit. However, a
lender that tries to improve its position against other creditors by intervening more substantially in the borrower's decisions and exercising control
over firm decision-making-rather than merely exploiting its exit threatis more likely to lose the advantage in bankruptcy. The voidable preference
period is extended to one year prior to bankruptcy if the transferee of the
payment or security interest is deemed to be a person with sufficient control
of the debtor (an "insider").96 Despite the longer preference period, it
remains a requirement that the debtor be insolvent at the time of the transfer. The granting of a security interest to a controlling lender (an insider)
may also be a fraudulent conveyance if the debtor had actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any other creditor. 97
The bankruptcy doctrine of equitable subordination further acts to
deter opportunistic lender behavior. This doctrine authorizes the court to
subordinate a lender's claim if the lender obtains an advantage at the
expense of other creditors as a result of its control over the borrower's man-

94. U.C.C. § 9-302, 9-304, 9-305. However, a lender whose debt is secured by a floating lien
over inventory or receivables may induce the firm to increase its purchases of inventory or create
receivables by lowering prices and increasing sales. The voidable preference rule reverses any benefit
resulting from increases in the value of the lender's collateral while the debtor was insolvent in the 90day period prior to bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (1994) (the two-point improvement test).
However, the build-up of inventory or receivables before insolvency is beyond the reach of the
preference provision and significantly more difficult to detect than the acquisition and perfection of new
security interests, which require public filings. Therefore, a bank that induces the build-up of inventory
or receivables enhances its position relative to other creditors in a manner that is unlikely to serve as a
signal that galvanizes intervention by other stakeholders.
95. In fact, the adjustments agreed to by the borrower may yield other positive externalities. For
example, the granting to a lender of a security interest, more restrictive covenants, or a convertibility
option may benefit other fixed claimants by deterring managerial misbehavior and control1ing the
tendency of the borrower to increase its risk-taking.
96. II U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1994).
97. Most states have adopted either the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act (U.F.C.A.) or the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (U.F.T.A.). A bankruptcy trustee may use these provisions by virtue
of its power under 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1994). The Bankruptcy Code has its own provision in § 548(a),
which reviews transfers made on or within one year prior to bankruptcy. Under all provisions, a transfer
is voidable if the debtor had actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any other creditor. U.F.C.A. § 7
(1918); U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(I) (1984); 11 U.S.c. § 548(a)(I) (1994). Unlike the other Acts, the U.F.T.A.
provides factors to assist courts in determining actual intent. One such factor is whether the transferee is
an insider. U.F.T.A. § 4(b)(I) (1984). Another factor is whether the debtor was insolvent or became
insolvent shortly after the transfer. U.F.T.A. § 4(b)(9) (1984). However, insolvency of the transferor is
presumably not a necessary condition under any of the Acts.
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agement. 98 The clearest case of control (de jure control) is a lender who
holds a majority block of voting shares of its borrower, either directly or
through a pledge of the shares. 99 However, the equitable subordination
doctrine also recognizes the leverage over day-to-day operations that stems
from instruments other than equity voting rights (de facto control).IOO To
trigger equitable subordination, the lender must essentially displace the
decision-making capacity of the borrower's management. lOl Bankruptcy
courts scrutinize the behavior of a lender who exercises control over its
borrower's cash flow: for instance, by holding an assignment of accounts
receivable or signing authority on the debtor's current account. l02 A lender
with the requisite degree of control over its borrower's business operations
also runs the risk of being held accountable for its actions under a fiduciary
standard. l03 Therefore, if the lender uses its control over the borrower to
obtain an advantage at the expense of other creditors, it may find its claims
subordinated to unsecured claims. For instance, if a controlling lender
98. See I I U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994). Most courts that apply the doctrine of equitable subordination
require the lender in control (an insider) to have engaged in inequitable conduct that resulted in injury to
other creditors or conferred an unfair advantage on the lender. See, e.g., In re Mobile Steel Co., 563
F.2d 692, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1977). If the lender does not have sufficient control to be viewed as an
insider, the courts have imposed a stricter test of egregious conduct such as fraud or misrepresentation.
See, e.g., In re Osborne, 42 B.R. 988, 996 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984) (noting that the main differences
between subordinating the claims of insiders and non-insiders "lie in the severity of the misconduct ...
and the degree to which the court will scrutinize" the actions (quoting In re Teltronics Serv., Inc., 29
B.R. 139, 169 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983»).
99. See, e.g., In re American Lumber, 5 B.R. 470, 478 (D. Minn. 1980) (subordinating claim of
lender with right to vote pledged shares in borrower); In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333,
337 (N.D. III. 1964) (subordinating claim of lender with voting rights in over 90% of borrower's
common stock), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds. 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966).
100. In the absence of de jure control, the courts look for de facto control over the day-to-day
operations of the debtor. See generally In re Auto Specialties Mfg. Co., Inc., 153 B.R. 457, 477-94
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993) (discussing the mechanisms of de facto and de jure control, and their
relevance to the doctrine of equitable subordination).
10 I. In this regard, the Fifth Circuit drew the following distinction:
Through its loan agreement, every lender effectively exercises "control" over its
borrower to some degreee. A lender ... will usually possess "control" in the sense that it can
foreclose or drastically reduce the debtor's financing. The purpose of equitable subordination
is to distinguish between the unilateral remedies that a creditor may properly enforce pursuant
to its agreements with the debtor and other inequitable conduct such as fraud,
misrepresentation, or the exercise ofsuch total control over the debtor as to have essentially
replaced its decision-making capacity with that of the lender.
In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
102. See, e.g., American Lumber, 5 B.R. at 478 (subordinating claim oflender that foreclosed on its
security interest in the debtor's receivables and contract rights and refused to honor the debtor's payroll
checks); Process-Manz, 236 F. Supp. at 339 (subordinating claim of lender that held assignment of
receivables, collected the proceeds, and supplied the funds for payroll and other expenses).
103. See, e.g., In re Teltronics Servs., Inc., 29 B.R. 139, 170-71 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). A
fiduciary relationship is sometimes the basis for assigning liability to a lender and at other times is an
intermediate finding toward equitably subordinating the debt claim of the lender. See, e.g.. Auto
Specialties, 153 B.R. at 478-79 ("The claim of a non-fiduciary creditor generally will not be equitably
subordinated unless egregious conduct on behalf ofthe creditor can be proven with particularity."); In re
Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co., Inc., 46 B.R. 125, 129 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (under either the fiduciary or
nonfiduciary standard, the creditor must engage in inequitable conduct to warrant subordination).
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receives a new security interest lO4 or benefits from an increase in the value
of an existing security interest at the expense of unsecured creditors,105 a
court in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding may subordinate the lender's
claim to those of other creditors.
In sum, a lender is relatively free to improve its position by exiting a
financially distressed firm, provided it does so before the firm becomes
insolvent. The gain from early exit serves as an incentive for early action,
and implicit compensation for the signal communicated by the exit to other
stakeholders of the firm. In contrast, a lender who chooses instead to intervene in the decision-making process of its borrower seems to lose a significant part of this immunity and must be careful if it subsequently decides to
exit. Therefore, a lender is forced to evaluate the likely efficacy of its voice
options at the time it detects managerial slack. If it lacks the necessary
expertise, then, from an interactive governance perspective, it should exit
rather than intervene in order to signal and prompt active intervention by
more effective stakeholders.

D. Bias in Lender Voice
The legal mechanisms described in the previous section act to constrain the most flagrant abuses of the leverage enjoyed by the bank over its
borrower's management. If the bank simply uses its exit threat to obtain a
concession during the 90-day period before bankruptcy and while the borrower is insolvent, the voidable preference provision may reverse the
advantage. If the bank intervenes extensively in the decision-making process of the borrower, it may be held to a higher standard of conduct under
the insider provisions of the voidable preference and fraudulent conveyance
provisions, as well as under the doctrine of equitable subordination.
However, judicial scrutiny under these provisions appears to be limited to
actions induced by the controlling lender (or insider) that unambiguously
improve the value of the lender's exit option at the expense of other creditors: for example, the granting of new security or the acquisition of additional property covered by the lender's existing security interest. These are
clear instances of conflict between the main lender and the other creditors.
In addition to using its exit threat to improve the terms of its loan, the
bank may instead exercise its voice to replace managers or to induce
104. See, e.g., In re Beverages Int'l Ltd., 50 B.R. 273, 284 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (subordinating
claim of creditor who delayed in obtaining and recording a blanket security interest to encourage third
parties to extend credit to the debtor); American Lumber, 5 B.R. at 478 (subordinating claim of
controlling lender who received new security interests in inventory and equipment from its distressed
borrower).
105. See, e.g., American Lumber, 5 B.R. at 478 (finding that, through its control over the
disbursements of the debtor, a lender permitted only those payments that were likely to enhance or
preserve the value of its collateral).
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changes in the investment or financing strategy of existing management. 106
At least at first glance, such actions would appear to address the problems
of managerial slack. However, the bank's intervention is a bundled good
which raises inter-investor conflicts and concerns about bias with respect to
investment, financing, and personnel decisions. When a firm is at or near
insolvency, the tensions among the interests of investor groups intensify,
particularly with respect to risk taking. As a result, to the extent that bank
lenders can influence the firm's business strategy, shareholders worry that
the firm's decisions may be too conservative in seeking to contain further
losses rather than pursuing profitable ventures. 107
This argument, however, may be overstated. Even at the best of times,
it is difficult to establish a governance process that aligns managerial incentives with the collective interests of all stakeholders. No single investor or
class of investors can represent the collective interest of all stakeholders of
an insolvent firm. The neoclassical model of the firm proposes that, given
an imperfect world, the optimal solution is to vest decision making authority with the residual claimants, who gain or lose at the margin from the
actions of the firm. Accordingly, several commentators argue that decisionmaking authority should pass from shareholders to unsecured creditors
when a firm becomes insolvent because unsecured creditors become the de
facto residual claimants at the margin. 108 If the bank is unsecured, it may
be an excellent representative of this class, providing it does not use its
authority to improve its position relative to the other members of its class.
As we have seen, several mechanisms exist to control this type of opportunistic behavior by banks: fraudulent conveyances, voidable preferences,
and equitable subordination.
In many cases, however, the bank is secured and is therefore not a
residual claimant. Even so, a bank has an interest in the recovery of the
firm as a going concern because of the prospect of continued or even

106. With respect to the lender's right to tenninate existing management, see Buckley, supra note
23, at 267-89. Empirical studies reveal a significant degree of bank involvement in termination
decisions in financially distressed firms. Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial
Distress, 25 J. FIN. EcON. 241, 248-52 (1989) (finding bank pressure to be third most important factor in
tennination decisions); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization ofLarge, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 737 (1993)
(finding evidence of creditor pressure in 45% of tennination decisions in sample). Stuart Gilson also
found that the representation of banks on the borrower's board increased during period of financial
distress. Gilson, supra note 55, at 365.
107. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Credit Markets and the Control ofCapital, 17 J. MONEY, CREorr,
& BANKING 133, 146 (1985) ("Lenders are only concerned with the bottom part of the tail of the
distribution of returns.").
108. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LoGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 167-69 (1986)
(identifying unsecured creditors as residual claimants during insolvency); cj Douglas G. Baird,
Fraudulent Conveyances, Agency Costs, and Leveraged Buyouts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. I, 10-11 (1991)
(same).
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increasing returns from future dealings with the borrower. 109 It stands to
reap increased business from a successful firm because it has an information advantage over outside lenders in bidding for financing opportunities in
the recuperated borrower. Moreover, if the bank has a perfected, broad
security interest, it enjoys a situational monopoly over the firm's future borrowing needs. 110 Therefore, banks often do participate in the upside prospects of their borrowers and this participation may dampen some of the
divergence in perspective on investment strategy. Moreover, the relative
effectiveness of the bank's voice in correcting managerial slack may outweigh the cost to the collective interest of any residual bias. Shareholders
of a firm in financial distress have a strong risk-taking bias and unsecured
creditors may lack expertise or be too diffuse to effectively temper that bias.
The secured bank-lender's intervention may be no worse than that of any
other constituency. Indeed, the problem may be instead that the bank is
more tempted by the exit option than the opportunity to intervene.
In this light, ex post judicial review of business decisions involves difficult and unpredictable determinations that are likely to deter desirable
intervention by banks to remedy managerial slack. As evidenced by the
business judgment rule that governs judicial review of management decisions, the courts are well aware of the difficulty of second-guessing corporate decisions. Accordingly, courts have generally not held lenders liable
for their influence on their borrowers' business decisions. The voice of a
lender ranges from advice and exhortation to exclusive control over the
firm's decisions. It may be general or specific in content and it may range
from permissive to compelling in force. 111 A lender who intervenes with
minimal force by suggesting courses of action to the borrower's management is unlikely to be found liable for the consequences of any decisions
made in response to its recommendation, even if the recommendation is
coupled with a threat of exit. 112 A lender who uses its threat of exit to
109. See Scott, supra note 35, at 916-19. Indeed, other fixed claimants, such as suppliers and trade
creditors, enjoy similar upside prospects.
110. Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1167-74 (1979).
111. As the bank's voice becomes more forceful, its legal responsibility for the actions of the
borrower increases. In the extreme case of absolute control, the lender may be deemed to be in a
fiduciary relationship with the borrower. Under the theories of agency, instrumentality, or alter ego, the
lender may then be held liable for debts incurred by the borrower during this period. See generally
Note, Lender Liability: A Survey ofCommon-Law Theories, 42 VAND. L. REv. 855, 862-67 (1989). See
also Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1102-07 (5th Cir.
1973) (describing the instrumentality doctrine in depth, before concluding that its applicability had not
been established as a matteroflaw in the case at bar), modified and reh'g denied. 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.
1974). If the court finds a principal-agent relationship, the lender may be liable for its borrower's debts
even if it has acted honestly and with due care in the exercise of its control. See Restatement (Second)
of Agency, § 14 0 (1958). See generally J. Dennis Hynes, Lender Liability: The Dilemma of the
Controlling Creditor, 58 TENN. L. REv. 635 (1991).
112. See, e.g., In re Prima Co., 98 F.2d 952, 965 (7th Cir. 1938) (holding that the lender's threat
was exercise of its legal right, and that borrower's acquiescence to demands did not demonstrate
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restrict certain actions or influence discrete decisions of the borrower will
probably not be held responsible to other investors. 113 There are a few
exceptions in the case law that increase the risk of intervention, 114 but findings of liability remain relatively rare. Indeed, potential gatekeeper liability
under securities or environmental laws may present more of a threat than
traditional lender liability doctrine. 115 The risk of lender liability is probably insufficient to deter intervention by banks who have otherwise both the
incentive and expertise to take steps to correct managerial slack.
In the interactive model, the doctrine of lender liability may serve to
screen stakeholders to ensure that the actor exercising voice has the best
incentive and expertise to correct managerial slack. If a bank has either
inappropriate incentives or inadequate expertise, the risk of lender liability
generally discourages it from meddling in the decision-making of the firm,
particularly for the purpose of promoting selfish interests that conflict with
those of investors as a group. In such a case, the theory of interactive governance assigns to the bank simply the task of signalling its detection of
slack by exiting. The task of instigating change in the firm is thereby left to
other, better-qualified and better-placed stakeholders. Moreover, where
there are severe conflicts of interest among stakeholders in a financially
distressed firm, the bankruptcy process offers an alternative-albeit
costly-mechanism in which all constituencies may be represented and
heard and the management of the firm continues under judicial oversight.
Indeed, bankruptcy law should be seen as providing the means to correct
managerial slack when the other mechanisms described in this Article have
failedY6
sufficient lender control), cert. denied. 305 U. s. 658 (1939); In re Technology for Energy Corp., 56
B.R. 307, 313-17 (Banke. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (refusing to find control where lender made suggestions
while threatening to exit).
113. See. e.g., In re Teltronics Ser., 29 B.R. 139, 172-73 (Banke. E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("There is
nothing inherently wrong with a creditor carefully monitoring his debtor's financial situation ..• or with
suggesting what course of action the debtor ought to follow.''); In re W.T. Grant Co., 4 B.R. 53, 76-77
(Banke. S.D.N.Y. 1980). However, a lender who has absolute veto over all business decisions may be
found to be in control and subjected to a higher standard of conduct. See supra notes 96-105 and
accompanying text and supra note 11 1.
114. A notorious example is State Nafl Bank of EI Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 686
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding lender liable where it threatened to call loan if a past CEO were
reinstated), error granted, set aside, dismissed as sell/ed. For a critique, see Fischel, supra note 73, at
144-46. For another example ofa claim of wrongful interference with contractual relations, see Kelly v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 85 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1936) (controlling bank induced issuance of
secured debt in violation of negative pledge clause in bond indenture).
115. See. e.g.• Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1994) (liability of controlling
persons); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1994) (same); Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA''), 42 U.S.C. §§ 96019675 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(2) (April 1992) (cleanup liability of secured commercial realestate lender who participates in management of debtor).
116. There may be an interesting link in this respect between the amount of debt issued by a firm
and the objective of correcting managerial slack. In particular, the amount of a firm's liabilities might
be set so that the occurrence of insolvency-the moment when the firm's value falls below the set
amount of liabilities-will indicate to stakeholders the likelihood of persistent managerial slack. If the
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In sum, it is well known that covenants in bank financing agreements,
when properly monitored for compliance, deter managerial slack and borrower misbehavior. In addition, the monitoring bank detects evidence of
slack or misbehavior when it does occur. If the bank exits or takes new
security in the assets of the borrower, it provides a signal to the other stakeholders that prompts intervention. Bank intervention seems desirable in
many cases because of the bank's significant stake in the borrower and its
acquired information and expertise. To the extent that bank monitoring corrects managerial slack or borrower misbehavior, it benefits all investors.
However, there are countervailing negative externalities stemming from the
bank's ability to exercise its influence to work out a better (lower risk) deal
for itself, rather than correct the problems with the borrower. The various
legal mechanisms described above target flagrant instances of opportunistic
use of bank voice and encourage the intervention of other, better-placed
stakeholders. In the absence of such constituencies, the bankruptcy process
offers a collective process of adjustment and reorganization under judicial
oversight.
II
THE

MECHANISMS OF INTERACTIVE GOVERNANCE

The decision to exit has two components: when to exit and whether to
exit completely or merely reduce the size of the stake in the firm. Voice is
a somewhat more complex reaction than exit. It can be measured along
three dimensions: (i) time, (ii) specificity, and (iii) force. First, the temporal dimension is determined by the duration and frequency of voice. Some
stakeholders opt for relatively brief, single-shot expressions of voice by, for
instance, simply alerting management to certain problems that have become
manifest in the corporation. Conversely, other stakeholders make a more
sustained commitment to voice, providing constant feedback and direction
to management by, for instance, taking a seat on the board of directors.
Second, voice may be a general exhortation (for example, to do better) or
precise recommendations tailored to address specific problems (for example, dismiss certain managers, terminate specific product lines, adopt certain projects). Third, voice may be accompanied by varying degrees of
compulsion depending on the legal or economic sanctions that expressly or
slack cannot be corrected through the mechanisms discussed in this Article, then bankruptcy
(reorganization or liquidation procedures) provides a (final) process for correcting the slack. Thus,
unlike the conventional view of bankruptcy as a process for resolving financial distress while preserving
going concern value, banktruptcy responds to the signal of financial distress to redress slack and thereby
enhance the firm's value. George G. Triantis, The Interplay of Liquidation and Reorganization in
Bankruptcy: The role ofscreens. gatekeepers and guillotines, 16 INT'L REv. L. & BeON. (forthcoming
1996). For a discussion ofcorporate governance in bankruptcy reorganizations, see Lynn M. LoPucki &
George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of
Financially Distressed Companies. 35 HARV. INT'L LJ. 267, 302-15 (1994); LoPucki & Whitford,
supra note 106.
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impliedly back the intervention. Thus, timing (composed of frequency and
duration), specificity, and force define the decision space for voice, and the
boundaries for any given stakeholder are determined by factors such as the
stakeholder's strict legal rights, level of economic investment, organizational status, and exit threat. ll7
Once the ambit of a stakeholder's voice options is defined, the stakeholder uses a self-interested cost-benefit analysis to choose between exit
and voice, and among voice options. llS Exit is usually the option that carries the most certainty; the value of voice, however, depends on the responsiveness of managers and their ability to effect change. This
responsiveness, in turn, is a function of the quality of the information held
by the actor, the boundaries of its voice options, and its expertise in choosing the most cost-effective configuration of voice. The vindication of stakeholder objectives is not always achieved most effectively by implementing
voice decisions characterized by the maximum frequency, specificity, and
force available to them. In particular, the effectiveness of voice in reversing
deterioration depends as much on subtle manipulation as brute force.
Moreover, the relationship between managerial performance and external
pressure or force probably yields an interior optimal solution that involves
less than maximum force.u 9
When exit is certain and cheap, a stakeholder is likely to prefer exit
over voice. For example, a retail shareholder would usually sell her shares
rather than attempt to correct slack by speaking or voting at annual meet117. For instance, the scope of voice discretion available to a low-level employee to control
managerial slack is highly constrained because of her limited legal rights, low organizational status, and
the fact that she can be replaced at low cost if she resigns. The decision space for voice available to a
shareholder may be broader because of her legal rights in directorial elections and the shareholder
proposal and approval process. On the basis of these rights, economic theory views shareholders as the
principals of the corporation. However, a range of legal constraints (for example, bylaw-making power
residing with directors, limited use of shareholder proposals, and restrictions on the ability of
shareholders to call general meetings) impedes their ability to influence the management of the large,
public corporation. As a result, shareholder voice is often surprisingly shallow in tenns of the
frequency, force, and precision of instructions it can provide to management. For a thoughtful analysis
of this legal model, see generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game
Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 347 (1991).
118. Of course, the stakeholder may be able to choose a combination of exit and voice. For
example, a shareholder may sell part of its interest and use the remainder as a leverage for voice.
Shareholders are often viewed as enjoying a broader menu of voice options than employees and
creditors who hold rule-oriented claims. Williamson, supra note 31, at 581-82. But see supra notes 5659 and accompanying text.
119. The genesis of this argument may be what is known as the Yerkes-Dodson law, which is
supported by a variety of experimental results involving animals and humans. Robert M. Yerkes & John
D. Dodson, The Relation of Strength of Stimulus to Rapidity of Habit-Formation, 18 J. COMPo
NEUROLOGY & PSYCHOL. 459, 470-71 (1908); JOHN ATKINSON & DAVID BIRCH, INTRODUCTION TO
MOTIVATION 148-49 (1978); see also George G. Triantis, Is Failure a Good Thing?: A Discussion ofthe
Motivational Properties ofDebt, CANADIAN L. & ECON. CONF. PAPERS & PROC., Sept. 1993 (arguing
that while debt may provide specific goals that increase motivation, it may impair perfonnance if the
goals are set too high).
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ings. 120 Indeed, this is precisely her role as contemplated by the interactive
theory. In contrast, a stakeholder who has made a substantial investment in
or specific to the corporation usually faces a more complex decision
because its exit is more difficult and it has broader voice options than the
retail shareholder. Thus, a large shareholder who tries to sell its financial
interest reveals information to the market and thereby impairs the terms on
which it can exit. 121 Conversely, by virtue of its stake in the firm, it can
exert pressure on management, correct the slack in the firm, and increase
the value of its investment. l22 This combination of factors helps to explain
the emerging role of active institutional investors who own large stakes in
publicly held companies.
The exit or intervention of a stakeholder is prompted by information
indicating an undesirable state of affairs. This information may be generated by the stakeholder's direct monitoring of the corporation or by a signal
received from other stakeholders. To describe in general terms the monitoring effort, however, we begin with a solitary stakeholder who neither
observes nor is affected by the actions of other constituencies. The level of
monitoring effort undertaken by the solitary stakeholder depends on the
nature of its access to valuable information. Some information is acquired
casually in the course of the stakeholder's interaction with the firm.
However, for the most part, information generation is the result of an
explicit investment in the acquisition, processing, and interpretation of
information. The cost of this activity is a function of variables such as
expertise, technology, economies of scale, and, for stakeholders with multiple links to the firm, economies of scope. The benefits from monitoring are
more difficult to evaluate because they are based on the probability of materialization of undesirable states and they are contingent on the choice of
reaction options at that time. Yet, the availability and value of either exit or
voice options depends in turn on the content of the information held by the
stakeholder as a result of its monitoring. The extent to which the information is shared by others is also an important variable. For instance, exit
based on stale or widely known information typically results in less net gain
than exit based on fresh information, but the effect of widely disseminated
information on voice is more equivocal. In some cases, there may be clear
first-mover advantages which limit the capacity of later actors to exercise
120. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 2, at 46.
121. John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277, 1329 (1991) (noting that exit by a block shareholder will lead to a
"collapse" in the market price). Exit is also problematic for employees who have firm-specific skills
and face the additional hurdle of signaling their quality to other employers after they exit. See Ronald
Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be Compassionate?, 43 U. TORONTO L.J.
315,318-21 (1993) (discussing problems facing displaced employees after takeover).
122. The large shareholder with private information should be aware that the exercise of some
types of voice must be disclosed to the market (for example, as required by securities regulation) and
this may make future exit no easier than the current sale of the shareholder's significant stake.
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influential voice. 123 In other cases, management may be more responsive to
a broad-based coalition of stakeholders that can only be galvanized through
a wide distribution of information. In any event, given the close interrelation between monitoring effort and reaction options, a stakeholder must
subject its monitoring decisions to continuous cost-effective reassessment
as the stakeholder receives new information respecting the efficacy of both
monitoring and action over time.124
Whereas delegation of monitoring and reaction responsibility is alien
(by definition) to the model of solitary stakeholder monitoring, it is germane to more realistic theories of interdependent stakeholder governance.
The interdependent governance theory contemplates value-maximizing
delegations of governance responsibility among stakeholders that take
advantage of specialization in monitoring and reaction by assigning monitoring functions to the lowest-cost actors. The agent stakeholder "walks the
beat" for the principal stakeholder,125 intervening where necessary to protect the interests of both parties. Delegations may be both within and
between classes of stakeholders. Typically, interdependent theories of governance focus on delegations of authority within stakeholder classes: retail
shareholders who rely on institutional shareholders,126 and secured creditors
who rely on unsecured creditors. 127 Delegations across distinct stakeholder
groups are, however, seldom observed in the literature. 128 In large part,
lack of attention to these arrangements is a legacy of the power of financial
agency theory and its central premise that distinct stakeholder classes have
interests that conflict with one another. Yet, it is important not to overstate
the importance of interstakeholder conflictS. 129 Even as between stakeholder classes, conflicting goals need not thwart efficient delegations of
authority arising from a common concern with correcting managerial slack.
123. While all stakeholders share a common concern with controlling slack, stakeholder
preferences may vary in the precise manner in which an identified instance of managerial misbehavior
should be corrected. Shareholders and creditors both disdain managerial slack, but have different ways
of resolving the misbehavior corresponding to their underlying utility functions. By moving first, a
nimble stakeholder may be able to impose its preferences on the firm and preempt further action by
subsequent actors. Compared to a situation in which the slack goes completely uncorrected, the second
mover's welfare is improved, though not as much as if he were the first mover.
124. For a description of the role of iterative information acquisition and processing in decision
making, see George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations ofUnknown Risks: A Critique ofthe Doctrine
of Commercial Impracticability. 42 U. TORONTO LJ. 450, 457-63 (1992).
125. This term is from Scott, supra note 35, at 931.
126. See sources cited supra note 14.
127. See. e.g.• Jackson & Kronman, supra note 110, at 1152-58; cf. Levrnore, supra note 21, at 5559 (arguing that unsecured creditors rely on secured creditors to monitor collateral serving as focal
points).
128. For notable exceptions, see sources cited supra note 21.
129. As Coffee has shown, stakeholder coalitions within the corporation can emerge around various
issues and at various times, only to dissolve later when conditions change. Coffee, supra note 121; see
also Daniels, supra note 121.
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As measured against the goal of controlling managerial slack, it is
clear that a wide range of stakeholders have information and expertise that
arise naturally from their relations with the firm and that can contribute to
effective firm governance. For example, employees have access to information regarding internal production processes. Customers watch for
changes in the quality of the goods or services produced by the firm.
Suppliers observe the quality and quantity of the firm's inputs, as well as
changes in the firm's accounts payable. Shareholders may obtain information through their representation on the board of directors. A bank lender
may monitor the firm's cash flows if the firm maintains its current account
with the bank. Hence, the task for institutional design is to ensure that the
distinctive information available to each stakeholder group is impounded
into the governance process. In this respect, the goals of corporate governance differ little from those of the efficient market-in F.A. Hayek's terms,
to capitalize on "the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and
place."130
Although the interdependent theory is sensitive to the potential for
stakeholders to delegate governance authority across stakeholder classes, it
fails to capture the rich texture of institutional arrangements that support
multi-stakeholder governance. Specifically, the theory posits sweeping
delegations of both monitoring and reaction responsibility that, at least as
far as control of managerial slack is concerned, are not congenial to shared
governance responsibility. The delegation of power from stakeholder to
agent is crisp, encompassing, and static. Once the authority is delegated to
an agent by a principal stakeholder, the principal's role as a governance
actor virtually ceases. Henceforth, instead of monitoring the firm and
devising appropriate reaction strategies, the principal stakeholder worries
solely about the performance of its delegate.
In contrast to the interdependent theory, the interactive corporate governance theory sees stakeholder relations as more complex and dynamic
than simple dependencies. 131 Without explicit coordination, stakeholders
engage in a shared and continuous process of information collection and
interpretation that exploits the full breadth of perspectives and expertise
possessed by different stakeholders. Stakeholders located in remote reaches
of the corporation, who are largely passive in the conventional interdependent governance model, may contribute to the interactive governance pro130. This phrase is taken from Hayek's characterization of the strengths of market over commandbased systems of resource al1ocation. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON.
REv. 519, 521 (1945).
131. Gilson and Roe have developed a cooperative and somewhat interactive model of stakeholder
governance ("contractual governance'') to describe the operation of the Japanese keiretsu. Ronald J.
Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance
and Industrial Organization. 102 YALE L.J. 871, 881-95 (1993). Nevertheless, in stark contrast to our
model, Gilson and Roe regard widespread equity investment as the key component to successful
stakeholder interaction in the keiretsu. Id. at 887.
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cess even if they have no direct impact on management. Their monitoring
enhances the quality of:firm governance by conveying timely, front-line
information to other stakeholders who have more significant voice capabilities. For ease of reference, we occasionally refer to the former as monitoring stakeholders and the latter as sophisticated or active stakeholders.
Sophisticated stakeholders rely on the real-time information provided by
monitoring stakeholders to flesh out their understanding of management's
performance. Like pieces in a complex puzzle, the bits of information collected by diffuse stakeholders yield limited understanding when viewed
alone; when combined with other fragments, however, they enable sophisticated stakeholders to discern the true performance of the:firm. On the basis
of this information, the sophisticated stakeholder can take remedial actions
that, in turn, can benefit all stakeholders.
Hence, we now return to the two fundamental claims on which the
interactive governance theory rests. First, stakeholders relay valuable information to each other, particularly from stakeholders with less scope for
direct influence on :firm decisions to more sophisticated stakeholders.
Second, the interactivity is justified by the existence of a common goal of
:firm value maximization that is not overshadowed by conflicts in interest
among stakeholders. The remainder of this Article examines these postulates in greater detail, with the aid of two examples of the process at work.
The first claim calls for an elaboration of the means by which signals
are communicated among stakeholders. The simplest is direct communication. For example, a production employee may alert a creditor or shareholder of defects in the production process. 132 Frequently, however,
information is conveyed through actions (exit or voice) undertaken by monitoring stakeholders and observed by others. Consistent with the focus of
this Article, we are concerned mostly with exit because it has been ignored
as a component of corporate governance. Yet, the sale of stock by a shareholder, the termination of deliveries by a supplier or of orders by a customer, and the acceleration of debt obligations by a lender often send useful
signals to other stakeholders through a variety of channels.
The first example of the interactive model at work concerns Cray
Research. The resignation of Dr. Steven Chen from Cray Research illustrates the role of employee monitoring and exit in corporate governance.
Through the early and mid-1980s, Cray experienced extremely rapid
growth in revenues and earnings from supercomputer production and sales.
In 1987, it ascended to the list of Fortune 500 companies, and recorded the
highest profit margin of any company in that group. 133 However, in
132. Although dissatisfied employees may complain to stronger voice stakeholders (that is,
shareholders or board members), uncertainties in the reaction of these stakeholders, in addition to fear
over management reprisals, make this a risky strategy.
133. Anatole Kaletsky, Where Does Cray Go Now Chen Has Packed His Bags? FIN. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1987, at 14.
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September of that year, one of its leading engineers, Dr. Steven Chen,
resigned. His departure was apparently instigated by a disagreement with
management concerning the pace of development of a new parallel processing technique. In forty-eight hours, Cray's stock plummeted from $113 per
share to $97.75 per share. 134 The drop in the market value reflected not
only the loss of Chen, but arguably also unfavorable information concerning Cray that was signalled by his decision to leave. A leading financial
newspaper described the market's reaction to Chen's departure as follows:
At a minimum, Chen's departure seems to have deflated the
image of a company which had come to epitomise that philosopher's stone of high-tech business: a balanced melding of scientific
leadership and financial success . . . .
The fear now is that Chen's resignation and the cancellation of
the MP project may point to a dilution of this happy blend of technology and commerce. That Cray, in fact, may be the latest

instance of a great American science-based company getting too
bureaucratic and too stingy to keep ahead in the technological
race. 135
Chen's resignation sparked a rash of publicity about Cray, much of it
expressing concern about Cray's competitiveness in the U.S. and Japanese
supercomputer industry.136 Thus, Chen's resignation undoubtedly communicated information to Cray's investors and other stakeholders about slack
in research and development strategy at the company. The message was
accentuated by the departure of an additional forty-two employees who left
to join Chen in his new supercomputer venture. 137 Unfortunately, Cray's
problems have not disappeared. 138 As a result, it is admittedly more difficult to demonstrate that Chen's signal instigated a successful correction
within the company.
One premise of the interactive model is that sophisticated stakeholders
pick up signals from other stakeholders. However, the fact that signals are
sent does not assure that the signals can be interpreted correctly. The quality of exit signals varies a great deal. Many signals are cloudy and therefore
134. Id.
135. Id. (emphasis added); see also Lawrence Edelman, Cray's Shares Fall Again As Resignation
Clouds Future, REuTER Bus. REP., Sept. 3, 1987 ("The Chen departure has highlighted delays in that
program [the design of the new Y-MP line of supercomputers whose shipments were to begin in 1988],
which was pushed back about a year, analysts said.'').
136. See, e.g., John W. Verity et aI., The Hungry Pack Nipping at Cray's Heels. Bus. WEEK, Oct.
26, 1987, at llO.
137. Terry Fiedler, "If You Build It, They Will Come," 24 CORP. REP. MINN. No.4, at *3, April,
1993, available in LEXlS, NEWS Library, ASAPII File.
138. For the first six months of 1995, Cray Research, Inc., reported a net loss of $187,199,000, or
$7.41 per share, as compared to net earnings of $1.16 per share for the same period in 1994. Cray
Research Reports Second Quarter Results, PR NEWSWlRE, July 27, 1995, available in LEXlS, NEWS
Library, PRNEWS File.
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of limited value. In some cases, the exiting stakeholder herself has incentives to camouflage the signal. For example, a shareholder with a large
equity stake wishes to avoid sending an unambiguous signal of slack in the
:firm until she has sold all her interest in the company. In most cases, however, it is likely that the exiting stakeholder has no interest in expending
effort or resources either to cloud or to clarify the signal. In the absence of
an agreement, she is unable to capture any of the benefits from sending a
clear signal. Sales of stock in public securities markets, for instance, are
largely anonymous and therefore the identity of the vendor and the motivation behind the sale are difficult to decode.
However, where there is value in decoding such signals, one would
expect appropriate incentives and institutions to evolve. In some circumstances, the stakeholder may have a selfish interest in clarifying the reasons
for exit: for example, an employee makes it clear that she chose to leave
because of an objectionable state of affairs at her former employer. In other
cases, repeat governance players may establish conventions that promote
the reciprocal conveyance of clear signals across a number of different corporations. Information intermediaries, such as securities analysts or credit
rating agencies, facilitate such conventions by decoding ambiguous signals.
As an example of the decoding process that occurs upon the transmission of an ambiguous signal, it is helpful to examine the case of Barneys.
In November 1993, the press reported that Barneys, a prominent clothing
retailer in New York City, was late in its payments to most of its 7,400
suppliers and that many suppliers had stopped shipping goods to its
stores. 139 In addition, contractors who worked on Bameys' new Madison
Avenue store complained of similar delays in payment.140 The signal from
the suspension of deliveries would have been relatively clear but for
attempts by management to blur the signal by advancing a benign explanation for the disruption in supplies: it had several disputes (or "poor communication") with its suppliers concerning the quality of goods ordered and
payment terms. 141 Bameys also issued cash flow and earning figures purporting to show the financial health of the company.142 In the face of conflicting and ambiguous signals, retail analysts and suppliers' organizations
provided their respective interpretations based on their own investigations
of the signal. For instance, the New York Times quoted the president of
139. Amy M. Spindler, Barneys Says It's Healthy; Vendors Fret. N.Y.
D1.
140.
141.

TIMES,

Dec. 17, 1993, at

Id.
Id.
As a privately held company, Bameys had no obligation to disclose this financial information.

142.
Its figures showed earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization of $6.7 million for the
quarter ended October 31, up from $3.9 million a year earlier. Id. at D6. In the face of ongoing
skepticism, the company's management was forced to release even more detailed financial data
(including projected financial results) to suppliers, factoring companies, and financial newspapers. See
Barneys New York Opens Books to Ease Concerns, REurERS, LIMITED, FIN. REp., Feb. 25, 1994.
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Barnard's Retail Consulting Group and the publisher of The Retail
Marketing Report: "'The arrogance of Bameys is legendary,' he said.
'But in this instance it seems a cover-up for internal financial
pressures.' "143
Ultimately, the rumors respecting Bameys' payment difficulties were
communicated to other stakeholders, namely investors who were contemplating a $55 million private debt offering. In contrast to a straight debt
offering that had been concluded early in 1993, concerns over the financial
condition of Barneys required that the company both provide security for
the additional funds and pay a higher premium. l44 This suggests that the
exit decisions by suppliers conveyed important information to more sophisticated institutional investors who were then able to impound this information into the terms of their debt contracts with Bameys. Thus, the
suspension of deliveries by suppliers (a form of exit) can provoke a public
response from management, as well as investigation by information
intermediaries who are paid to transmit and decode such signals.
Given that stakeholders can and do monitor each other's signals, and
can properly interpret these signals, we now tum to the second assumption
underlying our theory: that stakeholders share common goals and interests
that outweigh their conflicting interests. This is best established indirectly
by showing that special rules modify the governance system when the conflicting interests become too strong. While stakeholder interests in solvent
firms normally coalesce around the goal of controlling managerial slack,
this convergence weakens as the financial condition of the firm deteriorates. 145 Shareholders of a distressed firm are more intent on persuading
their managers to gamble the firm's way back to prosperity than
debtholders who, as a group, have the opposing preoccupation with containing losses. Individual creditors strive to improve their priority position relative to others, while customers with outstanding orders urge the firm to
deliver to avoid having their contractual rights liquidated into unsecured
claims. Employees, like managers, simply want to keep their jobs. The
conventional premise in governance models is that managers are agents,
albeit imperfect, of their shareholders. However, it is more realistic to presume that, to the extent that managers are prevented from pursuing their
self-interest exclusively, one or more nonequity constituencies may also
affect managerial decisions. Yet, there is no a priori pattern of shared
influence among heterogeneous constituencies. In sum, while significant
gains are yielded by interactive corporate governance, it is important to
143. Spindler, supra note 139, at D6.
144. Tom Kershaw, Market Roundup, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Jan. 3, 1994, at *2, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, ASAPII File.
145. In fact, conflicts may exist to some degree even in solvent states of the firm when, for
instance, lenders (particularly with priority) are less concerned about managerial slack (for example,
compensation and consumption of perquisites) than residual claimants from whose pockets these
payments are dravffi first.
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underscore the often-fragile compacts that undergird these activities, and
the corresponding role for institutional design in ameliorating conflicts
among stakeholders. As we observed in Part II in the context of the exit
and voice of bank lenders, various legal and economic forces emerge over
time to mitigate the agency problems between active and passive stakeholders, while preserving the benefits from interactivity.
CONCLUSION

In this Article, we have set out the contours of an alternative theory of
corporate governance-interactive corporate governance-that emphasizes
the extensive and quite complex array of interactions that occur among
stakeholders in the modem firm in response to managerial slack. We did so
by analyzing the role of bank debt in the American system of corporate
governance. Although reaction to slack can occur via either voice or exit
mechanisms, we focused our efforts on demonstrating the value of the latter. We also sought to explore the role of legal rules and organizational
arrangements that channel the exit decisions of individual stakeholders for
the benefit of the firm as a whole. Indeed, an interactive process that may
be triggered anywhere within the web of contracts in the firm may explain
the virtue of the American corporation today-its flexibility and
adaptability.
The development of the interactive corporate governance theory raises
several issues that are fruitful for further research. First, the theory's structure could benefit from the insight of game theory, particularly regarding
the incentives for stakeholders to deliberately suppress their exit decisions
from the purview of other, more sophisticated, corporate actors, and the
ways in which these incentives can be modified. Second, the positive value
of the theory should be assessed against a broader array of stakeholder
interactions than the ones we have addressed. Among the more interesting
is the relatively neglected area of shareholder and employee interdependence. Specifically, what institutions exist to ensure that private information respecting managerial slack is transmitted to shareholders and/or
directors in real time? Third, the interactive theory of corporate governance
contains several unexplored implications for the current debate over the relative efficiency of foreign versus domestic systems of corporate governance, and, in particular, the governance role of banks in those systems. 146
The frequently expressed concern is with the restrictive impact of American
146. Michael Porter, Remarks at the Securities and Exchange Commission Conference on
Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness (Mar. 19 and 20, 1992); see also Mark J. Roe,
Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan. and the United States. 102 YALE LJ.
1927, 1948-56 (1993) (identifYing the sometimes cumbersome political constraints placed on U.S.
banks). For two lucid responses to Roe's argument see J. Mark Ramseyer, Columbian Cartel Launches
Bidfor Japanese Firms, 102 YALE L.J. 2005 (1993) (responding to Roe and others who seek to blame
the American system of corporate governance for lackluster U.S. economic performance) and Roberta
Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons From Comparative Corporate Law. 102 YALE LJ.
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banking legislation on the size of, and activities carried out by, American
banks. Specifically, the claim is that because American banks historically
could not invest in equities, their governance role was subverted.
Nevertheless, the interactive theory we have developed suggests that specialized-albeit fragmented-monitoring and reaction by diffuse stakeholders can be rationally integrated into the governance process. If so, our
theory suggests that bank equity restrictions may not have had a disabling
impact on American corporate governance.

2021 (1993) (questioning Roe's assumption that the restraints placed on U.S. banks are necessarily a bad
thing).
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